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Defining Compensable Injury in 
Biomedical research 
Megan E. Larkin† 
Abstract 
Biomedical research provides a core social good by enabling 
medical progress. In the twenty-first century alone, this includes 
reducing transmission of HIV/AIDS, developing innovative therapies 
for cancer patients, and exploring the possibilities of personalized 
medicine. In order to continue to advance medical science, research 
relies on the voluntary participation of human subjects. Because 
research is inherently uncertain, unintended harm is an inevitable 
part of the research enterprise. Currently, injured research 
participants in the United States must turn to the “litigation lottery” 
of the tort system in search of compensation. This state of affairs fails 
research participants, who are too often left uncompensated for 
devastating losses, and makes the United States an outlier in the 
international community. In spite of forty years’ worth of Presidential 
Commissions and other respected voices calling for the development of 
a no-fault compensation system, no progress has been made to date. 
One of the reasons for this lack of progress is the failure to develop a 
coherent ethical basis for an obligation to provide compensation for 
research related injuries. This problem is exacerbated by the lack of a 
clear definition of “compensable injury” in the biomedical research 
context. 
This article makes a number of important contributions to the 
scholarship in this growing field. To begin, it examines compensation 
systems already in existence and concludes that there are four main 
definitional elements that must be used to define “compensable 
injury.” Next, it examines the justifications that have been put forth 
as the basis for an ethical obligation to provide compensation, and 
settles on retrospective nonmaleficence and distributive and 
compensatory justice as the most salient and persuasive. Finally, it 
uses the regulatory elements and the justifications discussed in the 
first two sections to develop a well-rounded definition of 
“compensable injury” that is tailored to the biomedical research 
context. Using this definition, it argues for the development of a first-
of-its-kind no-fault compensation system in the United States. 
 
† Post-doctoral fellow, National Institutes of Health, Department of 
Bioethics; B.S. Emerson College; J.D. Boston University.  
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Introduction1 
In March of 2006, eight healthy young male volunteers in London 
participated in a first-in-human trial of the novel monoclonal 
antibody TGN1412.2 Animal studies indicated that TGN1412 was not 
likely to have lasting adverse biomedical effects.3 Nonetheless, within 
ninety minutes of the drug’s administration, the six volunteers 
randomized to the active arm of the trial suffered headaches, nausea, 
vomiting, and other symptoms.4 Within twelve hours of the drug’s 
administration, all six had suffered multi-organ failure and were in 
critical condition for several days.5 Many suffered lasting injuries that 
left them unable to work and dependent on medical care.6 The 
TGN1412 trial is a vivid example where research risks that seemed 
unlikely to occur materialized in a way that severely injured healthy 
volunteers.7  
In 1993, five participants that had enrolled in U.S. clinical trials 
of an experimental Hepatitis B therapy, fialuridine, died as a result of 
 
1. This research was supported by the Intramural Research Program of the 
NIH, and the Warren G. Magnuson Clinical Center. The opinions 
expressed here are the views of the author. They do not represent any 
position or policy of the National Institutes of Health, the Public Health 
Service, or the Department of Health and Human Services. The author 
is a U.S. government employee who must comply with the NIH Public 
Access Policy, and the author or NIH will deposit, in NIH’s PubMed 
Central archive, an electronic version of the final manuscript upon 
acceptance for publication, to be made publicly available no later than 
12 months after the official date of publication. The author would like 
to thank Seema Shah, Alan Wertheimer, Ben Berkman, Leslie Meltzer 
Henry, Joe Millum, Kevin Outterson, Francis Miller, and Ron Ghatan 
for their thoughtful comments and helpful suggestions on previous 
drafts. 
2. Ganesh Suntharalingam et al., Cytokine Storm in a Phase 1 Trial of the 
Anti-CD28 Monoclonal Antibody TGN1412, 355 NEJM 1018, 1018 
(2006).  
3. See id. at 1027. 
4. Id. at 1018. 
5. Id. 
6. See Michael Seamark, “Elephant Man” Drug Trial Victim Set to Win 
£2m Payout for Horrific Injuries, DAILY MAIL, Apr. 29, 2008, 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1015349/Elephant-Man-drug-
trial-victim-set-win-2m-payout-horrific-injuries.html. 
7. Elisabeth Rosenthal, When Drug Trials Go Horribly Wrong, N.Y. TIMES 
Apr. 7, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/07/world/europe/07iht-
drug.html. 
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the administration of the study drug.8 Because the subjects in the 
TGN1412 were in England, national laws and industry guidelines 
ensured that they would receive at least some compensation.9 They 
ultimately received more damages by alleging negligence on the part 
of the company running the clinical trial.10 The fialuridine trial 
subjects and their families, by contrast, were required to turn to the 
U.S. tort system “in search of compensation.”11 The Institute of 
Medicine published a report on the trial that, in part, recommended 
that a no-fault compensation system for research injuries be developed 
in the United States.12 To this date no progress has been made.13 
Biomedical research provides a core social good that has 
dramatically improved the quality of life around the world.14 As one 
commentator noted, “[e]xtremely serious and widespread diseases that 
plagued prior generations—yellow fever, polio, measles, diphtheria, 
and pertussis—have been almost eradicated through vaccines 
developed using complex and ground-breaking research.”15 Research 
 
8. Robin McKenzie et al., Hepatic Failure and Lactic Acidosis Due to 
Fialuridine (FIAU), An Investigational Nucleoside Analogue For 
Chronic Hepatitis B, 333 NEJM 1099, 1099 (1995). 
9. See Seamark, supra note 6, at 2; Rosenthal, supra note 7, at 3 (noting 
that individuals may be eligible for £30,000 to £40,000 or more with 
permanent damages under relevant law, but that the sponsor only took 
out a £2 million insurance policy on the trial); but see Peter Mansell, 
Window is Open for Compensation in TGN1412 Case, CLINICAL NEWS 
(Mar. 14, 2007), http://www.pharmatimes.com/article/07-03-
14/Window_is_open_for_compensation_in_TGN1412_case.aspx 
(stating that each participant had thus far received £10,000, but that 
they were hoping to obtain more by proving negligence). 
10. Seamark, supra note 6. 
11. COMM. TO REVIEW THE FIALURIDINE (FIAU/FIAC) CLINICAL TRIALS, 
REVIEW OF THE FIALURIDINE (FIAU) CLINICAL TRIALS 96 (Frederick J. 
Manning & Morton Swartz eds., 1995) (noting that while almost two 
million dollars had been spent on care for trial participants, many 
resorted to litigation “in search of compensation.”). 
12. Id. 
13. Leslie Meltzer Henry, Moral Gridlock: Conceptual Barriers to No-Fault 
Compensation for Injured Research Subjects, 41 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 
411, 420-21 (2013). 
14. U.S. PRESIDENT’S COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN 
MED. & BIOMED. & BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, COMPENSATING FOR 
RESEARCH INJURIES: THE ETHICAL AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF 
PROGRAMS TO REDRESS INJURED SUBJECTS 9 [hereinafter U.S 
PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS] (1982). 
(“The power of medicine to cure and prevent illnesses has increased 
enormously during the [twentieth] century. All those having access to 
medical care have been the beneficiaries.”). 
15. Elizabeth R. Pike, Recovering from Research: A No-Fault Proposal to 
Compensate Injured Research Participants, 38 AM. J.L. & MED. 9, 10-11 
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also provides an evidence base for public health interventions that 
increase life expectancies and reduce morbidity and mortality.16 In the 
twenty-first century, research continues to make progress in reducing 
transmission of HIV/AIDS,17 developing innovative therapies for 
cancer patients,18 and exploring the possibilities of personalized 
medicine.19 
In order to provide society with the benefits of medical progress, 
the biomedical research enterprise relies on the voluntary 
participation of research subjects on whom new drugs and 
interventions are tested and whose normal biological processes are 
also studied.20 Depending on the type of intervention being tested and 
the stage of the research, subjects may be either healthy volunteers 
from the community or individuals who currently suffer from the 
disease or condition that the study intervention is intended to 
alleviate. Research inherently exposes these subjects to risks—both 
known and unknown—associated with the study intervention, 
randomization, or research procedures.21 Unintended harm is, 
 
(2012); see also U.S PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL 
PROBLEMS, supra note 14, at 9. 
16. See, e.g., U.S. PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL 
ISSUES, MORAL SCIENCE: PROTECTING PARTICIPANTS IN HUMAN SUBJECTS 
RESEARCH 2 (Dec. 2011), available at 
http://bioethics.gov/sites/default/files/Moral%20Science%20June%2020
12.pdf. 
17. See Myron S. Cohen et al., Prevention of HIV-1 Infection with Early 
Antiretroviral Therapy, 365 NEJM 493, 493 (2011). 
18. See, e.g., Cancer Trends Progress Report – 2011-2012 Update, NAT’L 
CANCER INST. 1, 
http://progressreport.cancer.gov/doc.asp?pid=1&did=2011&mid=vcol&
chid=104 (last visited Nov. 19, 2014). 
19. Margaret A. Hamburg & Francis S. Collins, The Path to Personalized 
Medicine, 363 NEJM 301 (2010). 
20. U.S PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS, 
supra note 14, at 12-13. 
21. See id.; see also U.S PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF 
BIOETHICAL ISSUES, supra note 16, at 58. This is not intended to be an 
exhaustive list of possible sources of harm, but merely an illustration of 
some of the more common causes of harm. See, e.g., Annette Rid & 
David Wendler, A Framework for Risk-Benefit Evaluations in 
Biomedical Research, 21 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 141, 145-56 (2011) 
(setting forth a proposed framework for the analysis of research risks). It 
is not necessary at this point to distinguish between studies that pose a 
net risk to participants (where there is no prospect of direct benefit) and 
those where there is a prospect of direct medical benefit because the 
subject’s motivation for participation does not affect the societal or 
scientific benefit that the research produces. Nor does it relieve 
researchers, sponsors, or institutions of their duty to minimize risks. See, 
e.g., Steven Joffe & Franklin Miller, Bench to Bedside: Mapping the 
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therefore, an inevitable part of the research enterprise.22 While rare,23 
tragedies like the death in 1999 of eighteen-year-old Jesse Gelsinger 
from an unforeseen complication in a gene-therapy trial and the death 
or disability of participants in the fialuridine trial at the National 
Institutes of Health in 1993,24 have called national attention to the 
problem of biomedical research related injuries, but have not led to 
the creation of a comprehensive framework to provide compensation 
to those who are injured.  
This lack of progress continues in spite of the work of several 
presidential and other commissions charged with examining the issue 
of compensation for biomedical research related injuries.25 The subject 
was first raised in 1973 when the Department of Health Education 
and Welfare (DHEW) convened an ad hoc panel to address the 
ethical questions arising from the Tuskegee Syphilis Study.26 Four 
 
Moral Terrain of Clinical Research, 38 HASTINGS CENT. REP. 30, 36 
(2008) (stating that “[i]n research on healthy volunteers who have no 
prospect of medical benefit from research participation, nonmaleficence 
plainly does not require proportionality of risks and benefits for the 
subjects themselves. This lack of a requirement for proportionality is 
less obvious for sick patient-subjects, but it is still true. In both cases, it 
is both ethically justifiable and permissible, within appropriate limits, to 
expose research subjects to risks that are justified by the value of the 
knowledge to be gained from the research.”). But see id. (emphasizing 
also that researchers bear a duty of risk minimization within scientific 
constraints). 
22. See, e.g., U.S PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL 
ISSUES, supra note 16, at 56. 
23. See Robert Steinbrook, Compensation for Injured Research Subjects, 
354 NEJM 1871, 1871 (2006). 
24. See Pike, supra note 15, at 7, 9; Sheryl Gay Stolberg, The Biotech 
Death of Jesse Gelsinger, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 1999, 
http://www.nytimes.com/1999/11/28/magazine/the-biotech-death-of-
jesse-gelsinger.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm; see also Lawrence K. 
Altman, The Doctor’s World; Fatal Drug Trial Raises Questions About 
‘Informed Consent’, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 1993, 
http://www.nytimes.com/1993/10/05/science/the-doctor-s-world-fatal-
drug-trial-raises-questions-about-informed-
consent.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm; Marlene Cimons, The Deadly 
Risks of Research, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 25, 1993, 
http://articles.latimes.com/1993-08-25/news/mn-27830_1_drug-trials. 
25. Henry, supra note 13, at 412. 
26. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC., AND WELFARE, FINAL REPORT OF THE 
TUSKEGEE SYPHILIS STUDY AD HOC ADVISORY PANEL 7 (1973), available 
at http://biotech.law.lsu.edu/cphl/history/reports/tuskegee/report1.pdf. 
See also ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RADIATION EXPERIMENTS, 
FINAL REPORT 179 (1995), available at 
https://ia700402.us.archive.org/10/items/advisorycommitte00unit/advis
orycommitte00unit.pdf; see also ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON HUMAN 
RADIATION EXPERIMENTS, FINAL REPORT (1995), 
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years later, the 1977 DHEW Task Force on the Compensation of 
Injured Research Subjects concluded that research subjects were 
entitled to compensation if they suffered injuries that were 
proximately caused by research participation.27 This was followed by 
the report of the 1982 President’s Commission for the Study of 
Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral 
Research, which determined that there was justification for 
compensating injured research subjects, and that further study on the 
subject was needed.28 The 1995 Advisory Committee on Human 
Radiation Experiments recommended the payment of financial 
remedies to injured subjects of the World War II-era human radiation 
experiments.29 In 2001, the National Bioethics Advisory Committee 
found that, as a matter of justice, participants harmed “as a direct 
result of research should be cared for and compensated.”30 Most 
recently, in 2011, the President’s Commission for the Study of 
Bioethical Issues released a report entitled “Moral Science,” in which 
it argued that “subjects harmed in the course of human research 
should not individually bear the costs of care required to treat harms 
resulting directly from that research,” and that the federal 
government should further study the need for a national 
compensation system.31  
As is evident by the strikingly similar conclusions of the 1982 and 
2011 reports, policy growth in this area has been staggeringly slow. 
Many bioethics commissions attribute the lack of progress to a dearth 
of empirical data on the frequency and severity of research related 
injuries.32 Still, other authors have attributed the policy intransigence 
to “moral gridlock” in the form of disagreement over the ethical 
 
https://ia600402.us.archive.org/10/items/advisorycommitte00unit/advis
orycommitte00unit.pdf (last accessed Aug 9, 2014). 
27. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, SECRETARY’S TASK FORCE 
ON THE COMPENSATION OF INJURED RESEARCH SUBJECTS VI-9 (1977), 
available at 
http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015034851611;view=1up;s
eq=48 (last visited Feb. 16, 2015). 
28. See U.S PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS, 
supra note 14, at 4-5. 
29. See ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RADIATION EXPERIMENTS, supra 
note 26 at 801-05. 
30. See NAT’L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM’N, 1 ETHICAL AND POLICY ISSUES 
IN RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN PARTICIPANTS, at v (2001).  
31. U.S PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, supra 
note 16, at 8. 
32. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, supra note 27, at 
III-3; U.S. PRESIDENT’S COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS, 
supra note 14, at 5; U.S. PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF 
BIOETHICAL ISSUES, supra note 16, at 62. 
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justifications for compensation and what those justifications require of 
a compensation system.33 
The United States is an outlier among nations in not requiring 
compensation for research related injuries.34 The World Medical 
Association’s Declaration of Helsinki states that it is a requirement of 
ethical human subjects research that, “[a]ppropriate compensation 
and treatment for subjects who are harmed as a result of participating 
in research must be ensured.”35 The latest formulation of the 
Declaration is the first edition to include a requirement for 
compensation of research related injuries, and it is one indicator 
among many of a growing consensus among governments, policy-
makers, and commentators that injured research participants are 
owed both medical care and financial compensation.36  
Wide variation remains, however, in the reasons used to justify a 
requirement for compensation and the mechanisms of compensation 
used both by countries where research is conducted, and by research 
institutions themselves.37 Additionally, different countries have taken 
multiple approaches to the problem of compensation for research 
related injuries.38 These foreign approaches provide valuable guidance 
on how to define “compensable injury” in the United States and 
design a domestic system of compensation. Examination of 
international systems alone is, however, insufficient to justify the 
creation of a national compensation system. It is also necessary to 
undertake a robust examination of the ethical principles that justify a 
compensation requirement and to analyze how those ethical principles 
influence compensation systems already in place. This analysis should 
shape the design of any compensation system that is to be 
implemented in the United States. 
 
33. Henry, supra note 13, at 412-13. 
34. Pike, supra note 15, at 39. 
35. WORLD MED. ASS’N, DECLARATION OF HELSINKI, ETHICAL PRINCIPLES 
FOR MEDICAL RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN SUBJECTS 3 (2013), available 
at http://www.wma.net/en/30publications/10policies/b3/; see also 
Robert V. Carlson et al., The Revision of the Declaration of Helsinki: 
Past, Present and Future, 57 BRIT. J. CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY 695, 699 
(2004). 
36. See, e.g., Pike, supra note 15, at 10; WORLD MED. ASS’N, supra note 35, 
at 3. 
37. David B. Resnik et al., Research-Related Injury Compensation Policies 
of U.S. Research Institutions, 36(1) IRB 12, 13 (2014); U.S. 
PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, supra 
note 16, at 24;  Christopher J. S. Hodges, Research Injury in the 
European Community, 5 PHARMA. MED. 135, 135 (1991). 
38. See infra Part I; see also U.S. PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF 
BIOETHICAL ISSUES, supra note 16, at 57, 186-190. 
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The most pressing questions to come out of this process involve 
the definition of a “compensable injury.” Careful consideration of the 
justifications for providing compensation for research related injuries 
will define the contours of which injuries must be compensated by 
whom, and will aid in the development of a more comprehensive 
analytical framework.39 A survey of both international compensation 
systems and past compensation proposals in the United States reveals 
that there are four essential elements that systems should consider in 
order to fully regulate the provision of compensation for research 
related injuries: causation, type, degree, and remedy.40 Each element 
in this approach serves to define the contours of a compensable injury 
and to determine who owes what to whom.41 
This article is the first to lay out a comprehensive definition of 
“compensable injury” that is both ethically justified and incorporates 
all four regulatory elements. To reach this conclusion, Part I examines 
systems of compensation that are already in operation both 
domestically and internationally. This analysis reveals that 
compensation systems vary in both their definition of “compensable 
injury” and their use of causation, type, degree, and remedy. The 
experience of international compensation systems reflects different 
justifications for the provision of compensation and should be used to 
inform the development of any compensation system in the United 
 
39. The origins of the contemporary bioethics movement are often traced to 
the promulgation of the Nuremberg Code in 1949 (Evelyne Shuster, 
Fifty Years Later: The Significance of the Nuremberg Code, 337 NEJM 
1436, 1436 (1997)), the 1964 publication of the first version of the World 
Medical Association’s Declaration of Helsinki (Carlson et al., supra note 
35, at 1), and within the United States, to the 1979 Belmont Report, 
Ethical Principles and Guidelines for the Protection of Human Subjects 
of Research [Belmont Report], National Commission for the Protection 
of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research, Office of the 
Secretary, U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, 44 Fed. 
Reg. 23,192, 23,193-94 (Apr. 18, 1979) (codified at 45 CFR § 46), 
available at 
http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/humansubjects/guidance/belmont.html. The 
Belmont Report, published by the National Commission for the 
Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research in 
the wake of the 1974 National Research Act, set out three core 
principles that should guide those engaging in human subjects research: 
respect for persons, beneficence, and justice. These foundational ethical 
principles have been used to shape the norms currently found in many 
ethical codes and regulations governing the conduct of human subjects 
research. See Robert J. Levine & Angela R. Holder, Legal and Ethical 
Problems in Clinical Research, 7 CLINICAL RES. & REG. AFF. 315, 325 
(1989). 
40. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, supra note 27, at 
III-5; see also U.S. PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF 
BIOETHICAL ISSUES, supra note 16, at 57, 186-190. 
41. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, Supra note 27, at III-5. 
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States. Part II analyzes the justifications that have been put forth for 
compensation of research related injuries and argues that 
nonmaleficence and justice are the two most important. Part III uses 
the ethical justifications and the regulatory lessons developed earlier 
in the article to argue for a morally justified approach to defining 
compensable research injuries. It ends with a proposal for a 
compensation system that would fit with the justifications and 
definitions put forth. 
I. Compensation Systems Currently In Existence  
A. International Compensation Systems 
Most countries that host or conduct a significant amount of 
research have policies in place that require researchers or sponsors to 
provide some level of compensation for treatment of participants’ 
research related injuries.42 International standard setting bodies such 
as the World Medical Association (WMA) and the Council for 
International Organizations of Medical Sciences (CIOMS) have also 
argued that compensation for research related injuries is a necessary 
component of ethical biomedical research.43 A survey of international 
compensation systems reveals four main elements of regulating 
compensable research related injuries: cause, type, degree, and 
remedy.44 Different nations use multiple combinations of these 
elements to determine which research related injuries are entitled to 
compensation.45  
Within the international community, wide variation exists in the 
design of compensation systems used and the degree to which each 
system relies on each of the four regulatory elements. At a minimum, 
most nations have the requirement that the injury be causally related 
 
42. U.S. PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, 
supra note 16, at 57, 186-190. 
43. Id.; see also COUNCIL FOR INT’L ORG. OF MED. SCI., INTERNATIONAL 
ETHICAL GUIDELINES FOR BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN 
SUBJECTS 78 (2002) (“Investigators should ensure that research subjects 
who suffer injury as a result of their participation are entitled to free 
medical treatment for such injury and to such financial or other 
assistance as would compensate them equitably for any resultant 
impairment, disability or handicap. In the case of death as a result of 
their participation, their dependants [sic] are entitled to 
compensation.”); WORLD MED. ASS’N, supra note 35, at 3. 
44. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC, & WELFARE, supra note 27, at III-5 
(discussing these same elements). 
45. See, e.g., U.S. PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL 
ISSUES, supra note 16, at 186-190; see also Drugs and Cosmetics (1st 
Amendment) Rules, 2013, Gazette of India, Part II, Sec. III (i) (Jan. 30, 
2013) G.S.R. 53(E). 
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to the individual’s research participation.46 Some regulatory systems 
either limit or expand the class of eligible claimants by enumerating 
the types of injuries for which redress is required.47 Other countries 
also limit compensation to physical injuries of a certain degree, for 
example, severe or disabling injuries.48 Finally, a number of countries 
delineate the type and amount of remedy available.49 It is useful to 
look at examples of countries that use different combinations of these 
four regulatory parameters in order to illustrate the interaction 
between the justifications for compensation identified above and the 
definitions of compensable injury chosen.  
1. Simple Insurance Systems 
Initially, it is noteworthy that many countries do not define in 
detail what constitutes a compensable research related injury and 
instead have a minimum insurance requirement that research sponsors 
must fulfill.50 These simple insurance systems shift some or all of the 
cost of research related injuries on to sponsors and leave insurers to 
make determinations as to which injuries will be compensated.51 
Countries with simple insurance systems have varying levels of access 
to the courts for individuals who feel that compensation was 
 
46. See, e.g., Drugs and Cosmetics (1st Amendment) Rules, 2013, Gazette 
of India, Part II, Sec. III (i) (Jan. 30, 2013) G.S.R. 53(E) (India); India 
updated the Rules at the time this Article went to print.  See Drugs and 
Cosmetics (1st Amendment) Rules, 2014, Gazette of India, Part II, Sec. 
III (i) (Dec. 12, 2014) G.S.R. 889(E) (India). See also, e.g., Henry 
Johansson, The Swedish System for Compensation of Patient Injuries, 
115 UPSALA J. MED. SCIENCE 88, 88 (2010); see also Marie Bismark & 
Ron Paterson, No-Fault Compensation In New Zealand: Harmonizing 
Injury Compensation, Provider Accountability, and Patient Safety, 25 
HEALTH AFF. 278, 280 (2006). 
47. See, e.g., Johansson, supra note 46, at 88-90; see also Resolution N. 
196/96, de 14 Janeriro de 1987, Risks and Benefits V.6 (Braz.). 
48. See, e.g., SOUTH AFRICA DEP’T OF HEALTH, GUIDELINES FOR GOOD 
PRACTICE IN THE CONDUCT OF CLINICAL TRIALS WITH HUMAN 
PARTICIPANTS IN SOUTH AFRICA 1, 42 (2 ed. 2006), available at 
http://www.kznhealth.gov.za/research/guideline2.pdf. 
49. See, e.g., Chieko Kurihara et al., High Rate of Awarding Compensation 
for Claims of Injuries Related to Clinical Trials by Pharmaceutical 
Companies in Japan: A Questionnaire Survey, 9 PLoS ONE e84998, 3 
(2014). 
50. See U.S. PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, 
supra note 16, at 186-90 (listing country compensation requirements 
from around the world. Countries with simple insurance requirements 
include: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Denmark, Estonia, France, 
Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Latvia, Malta, 
Netherlands, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, United Kingdom, Brazil, 
Israel, Japan, Macedonia, Switzerland, Russia, and Ukraine). 
51. See id. 
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inadequate.52 At the opposite end of the spectrum, the United States 
and Canada simply require that research subjects be informed as to 
whether compensation will be made available, leaving to sponsors all 
determinations as to whether compensation will be provided.53 
2. Causation 
India is a prime example of a nation that regulates compensable 
research related injuries primarily based on a determination of what 
caused the injury. In a new compensation law passed in 2013, 
compensation is required for any injury or death of the subject 
occurring in the clinical trial for the following reasons: 
(a) adverse effect of investigational product(s); 
(b) violation of the approved protocol, scientific misconduct or 
negligence by the Sponsor or his representative or the 
investigator; 
(c) failure of investigational product to provide intended 
therapeutic effect; 
(d) use of placebo in a placebo-controlled trial; 
(e) adverse effects due to concomitant medication excluding 
standard care, necessitated as part of approved protocol; 
(f) for injury to a child in-utero because of the participation of 
parent in clinical trial; or 
(g) any clinical trial procedures involved in the study.54 
In light of concerns about the conceptual definition of the 
compensation requirements55 and the effect the requirements were 
 
52. See, e.g., Law Concerning Experiments on the Human Person, Art. 29 
(Belgium, 2004), 
http://www.erasme.ulb.ac.be/page.asp?id=11365&langue=EN#a29 
(requiring insurance coverage for liability and also allowing for access to 
the courts). 
53. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a)(6) (2001); Tri-Council Policy Statement, 
Ethical Conduct for Research Involving Humans, 1, 3-5 (2010), 
http://www.pre.ethics.gc.ca/eng/policy-politique/initiatives/tcps2-
eptc2/chapter3-chapitre3/#toc03-1a. 
54. Drugs and Cosmetics (1st Amendment) Rules, 2013, Gazette of India, 
Part II, Sec. III (i) § 2 1, 9 (Jan. 30, 2013) (India). 
55. See REPORT OF THE RANJIT ROY CHANDHARY EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE TO 
FORMULATE POLICY AND REMOVAL OF NEW DRUGS CLINICAL TRIALS AND 
BANNING OF DRUGS 15 (2013) [hereinafter CHAUDHARY REPORT], 
available at 
http://cdsco.nic.in/writereaddata/Report_of_Dr_Ranjit_Roy.pdf. 
Health Matrix·Volume 25·2015  
Defining Compensable Injury in Biomedical Research 
321 
having on India’s research industry,56 recent regulatory reforms have 
tempered the compensation requirement and built upon an expert 
report commissioned by India’s Central Drug Standards Control 
Organization.57 The new regulations require, among other things, 
consideration of whether the standard of care was provided to trial 
subjects when determining whether an injury is compensable.58 
Although the de minimus causation requirement is the most 
noteworthy facet of India’s 2013 law, the regulations also contain 
requirements with respect to the types of injury covered and the 
remedy owed.59 Although causation comes to the foreground when 
discussing India’s compensation regulations, the other regulatory 
elements are present, if less pronounced. 
3. Type 
Brazil, by contrast, broadens the class of eligible claimants by 
including all types of injury that may result from research 
participation. Brazil’s regulations require that “[r]esearch subjects 
that suffer any type of injury resulting from their participation in 
research . . . have the right to receive comprehensive medical care, as 
well as indemnity.”60 Research injuries are defined as “immediate or 
delayed injury to an individual or community, with proven, direct or 
indirect, causal relationship resulting from the scientific study.”61 And 
risks of research are defined as “possibility of injury to the physical, 
psychic, moral, intellectual, social, cultural, or spiritual dimensions of 
the human subject, during any phase of an investigation, or resulting 
therefrom.”62 Brazil regulates not just by cause, but also by type of 
injury, which includes a broad range of injuries that may be 
 
56. J. Sugarman, et al., India’s New Policy to Protect Research 
Participants, 347 BMJ f4841, at 1 (2013). 
57. See CHAUDHARY REPORT, supra note 55, at 6-8; Megan E. Larkin, 
Acoustic Separation and Biomedical Research: A Case Study of Indian 
Regulations on Compensation for Research-Related Injuries, J. LAW, 
MED., & ETHICS (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 1-4) (on file with 
author).  
58. See CHAUDHARY REPORT, supra note 55, at 3, 6-7, 85. 
59. See generally GSR 53(E), supra note 54; see also Drugs and Cosmetics 
(1st Amendment) Rules, 2013, Gazette of India, Part II, Sec. III (i) 
63(E) § 2 1, 4 (Jan. 30, 2013) (India); see also Drugs and Cosmetics 
(3rd Amendment) Rules, Gazette of India, Part II, Section III (i) (India) 
G.S.R. 73(E) (2013). 
60. Nat’l Health Council Resolution No. 196/96 on Research Involving 
Human Subjects § V.6 (1996) (Bra.) [hereinafter N.H.C. Res. No. 
196/96]; see also Pike, supra note 15, at 42. 
61. N.H.C. Res. No. 196/96 at II.9. 
62. Id. at II.8. 
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considered compensable if found to be suitably research related (i.e., 
having a direct or indirect causal relationship to the research). 
Examination of regulations like Brazil’s is important because it raises 
the question of whether injuries other than physical and financial ones 
should be considered compensable in light of the justifications for 
providing compensation. 
4. Degree 
A third type of regulation considers the degree of injury (in 
addition to causation and type) in order to determine which injuries 
are compensable. For example, the Association of the British 
Pharmaceutical Industry (ABPI) guidelines recommend compensation 
where “[o]n the balance of probabilities, the injury was attributable to 
the administration of a medicinal product under trial or any clinical 
intervention or procedure provided for by the protocol that would not 
have occurred but for the inclusion of the Participant in the trial.”63  
The ABPI guidelines further counsel that “[c]ompensation should 
only be paid for the more serious injury of an enduring and disabling 
character . . . and not for temporary pain or discomfort or less serious 
or curable complaints.”64 While these guidelines are voluntary, in 
practice they are widely followed. Additionally, when deciding 
whether to approve a research proposal, ethics committees are 
instructed to consider whether provision has been made for 
compensation in the event of serious injury or death.65 Notably, 
compensation is limited to those circumstances where care alone does 
not remedy the injury.66 A number of countries have modeled their 
compensation requirements on the ABPI guidelines.67  
5. Remedy 
Japan has based its system of compensation largely upon the 
ABPI guidelines. It departs from the ABPI model because it contains 
a more detailed definition of what amount of compensation is required 
 
63. THE ASS’N OF BRITISH PHARM. INDUS., CLINICAL TRIAL COMPENSATION 
GUIDELINES 4 (2014), available at http://www.abpi.org.uk/our-
work/library/guidelines/Documents/compensation_guidelines_2014.pdf 
(last visited Apr. 8, 2014). 
64. Id. 
65. See, e.g., THE ASS’N OF BRIT. PHARM. INDUS., INSURANCE AND 
COMPENSATION IN THE EVENT OF INJURY IN PHASE I CLINICAL TRIALS 4-5 
(2012), http://www.abpi.org.uk/our-
work/library/guidelines/Pages/clinical-trials-insurance.aspx (last visited 
Aug. 12 2014); see also Medicines for Human Use (Clinical Trials) 
Regulations, 2004, S.I. 2004/1031, art. 3, ¶ 15(5)(i) (U.K.). 
66. See S.I. 2004/1031, Part 3, cl. 15(5)(i) (U.K.); see also Pike, supra note 
15, at 62. 
67. Pike, supra note 15, at 42. 
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for different types of injuries.68  Japan’s standards for compensation 
are based on those of the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance 
Act, and cover the participant’s costs up to a certain limit (about 70 
percent) in exchange for the participant not having to prove 
negligence.69 The formula used to calculate the amount of damages 
owed includes the type and degree of injury and the participant’s 
earning capacity prior to the injury.70 The damages calculated under 
the formula are deemed to be those that would have been available 
had the participant taken the case to court.71 Those damages are then 
reduced by 30 percent.72 The justification for this reduction is that in 
lieu of the full amount of damages theoretically available through the 
legal system, the participant will receive payment quickly.73 One 
commentator has raised concerns that participants in therapeutic 
research or in phase one studies designed to test drugs that produce 
some benefit at the end of life may be underserved by the current 
calculation of damages because of their diminished earning capacity.74 
Recently, however, pharmaceutical companies have been narrowing 
the definition of compensable injuries to limit available compensation 
for less serious injuries (as judged by type and degree).75 
Compensation is made available through insurance purchased to cover 
such losses.76 Notably, such insurance is not required in all clinical 
trials thus leaving some gaps in the compensation available to 
participants depending on what type of trial they are enrolled in.77 
6. Comprehensive Medical Injury Compensation Systems 
A few nations have well-developed compensation systems that 
incorporate research related injuries into a larger national framework 
for compensation of medical injuries.78 These frameworks take into 
 
68. See Tatsuo Kuroyanagi, Compensation and Insurance for 
Participants/Subjects Harmed in Clinical Research Studies: Process of 
the Inheritance of Good Clinical Practice (GCP) in Japan and its 
Present Status, 56 JPN. MED. ASSOC. J. 458, 460-61 (2013). 
69. Id. at 461-62. 
70. Id. 
71. Id. at 461. 
72. Id. 
73. Id. 
74. Id. 
75. Id. 
76. Id. at 461-62. 
77. Id. at 463-64. 
78. See, e.g., Patient Injury Act, S-155.87, 9th Riksdag (Swed. 1996), 
available at 
http://www.patientforsakring.se/resurser/dokument/engelska_artiklar/
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consideration all four elements of defining an injury and provide a 
method for determining which injuries are eligible for compensation.79 
Sweden and New Zealand both provide interesting examples of how 
such a framework may be set up, and they provide useful lessons for 
those considering implementing a robust system of compensation. 
Sweden’s system of compensation for medical injuries is premised 
on the concept of “avoidability,” which is defined as a medically 
necessary action that, according to later evaluation, could have been 
avoided by using another available procedure that would have met 
the current research need in a less risk-filled manner. Avoidability is 
determined from a medical viewpoint in accordance with accepted 
standards observed by experienced researchers within the area 
concerned.80 Actions performed solely for research purposes are 
considered not medically necessary and are therefore entitled to 
compensation.81 Payment is provided through the Patient Insurance 
Association, which assures the same level of coverage for all public 
institutions in Sweden.82 Injuries caused by medication may be 
covered by either the Patient Insurance Association or by separate 
pharmaceutical insurance depending on the etiology of the injury.83 
Claims may be reviewed by the Patient Claims Panel, which is 
designed to support fair and consistent interpretation of the Patient 
Injury Act. The Panel may also issue opinions at the request of a 
claimant, provider, insurer, or court.84 Participants retain a right of 
action in the courts throughout the claims process.85  
Compensable injuries are defined as personal injuries that are 
either physical or mental, so long as the mental injury produces a 
“medically demonstrable effect.”86 All injuries must, “with 
 
The_Patient_Injury_Act.pdf; see also Section 2 of the Accident 
Compensation Act of 2001, as substituted by Section 10 of the Injury 
Prevention, Rehabilitation, and Compensation Amendment Act 2005 
(N.Z.), available at 
http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/2001/0049/latest/DLM99494.
html?src=qs (last visited Aug. 11, 2014) [hereinafter Accident 
Compensation Act]. 
79. The Patient Injury Act, S-155.87, 9th Riksdag, § 10 (1996); see also 
Section 2 of the Accident Compensation Act 2001, supra note 78. 
80. See ULF HELLBACHER ET AL, PARTICIPANT INJURY COMPENSATION FOR 
HEALTHCARE-RELATED INJURIES 20-21 (2007). 
81. Id. at 23. 
82. Id. at 14. 
83. Id. at 39-40. 
84. Id. at 14. 
85. Id. at 15. 
86. Id. at 17. 
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preponderant probability be caused by measures or conditions” of 
treatment in order to be compensable.87 “Direct consequences of the 
underlying disease and injuries that would have occurred or developed 
anyway, regardless of medical care, are therefore not eligible for 
compensation.”88 Most injuries do not have a limit for compensation 
based on degree, but injuries caused by infections must be of a type 
not reasonably expected to be tolerated by a patient in order for it to 
be compensable.89 Compensation is also available for accident related 
injuries if they are “related to and typical of healthcare activities.”90 
Injuries due to inadequate information or failure to obtain consent are 
handled under the general tort law framework.91 Compensation under 
the Patient Insurance Act is equal to 80 percent of damages for the 
injury as calculated under Section 1 of the Tort Liability Act.92 
New Zealand’s system differs slightly from that implemented in 
Sweden in both its method of financing compensation and the criteria 
used to define “compensable injury.” Unlike Sweden’s system, which 
relies on mandatory insurance, New Zealand has adopted a publically 
funded system for compensating people with personal injuries that 
replaces its tort system.93 New Zealand’s Injury Prevention, 
Rehabilitation, and Compensation Act allows coverage for, among 
other things, “treatment injuries caused as part of a clinical trial.”94 In 
order for compensation to be available, an ethics committee must 
have approved the trial and have been satisfied that the trial was not 
conducted “principally for the benefit of the manufacturer or 
distributor of the medicine or item being trialed.”95 Participants 
injured during a trial that was not approved by an ethics committee 
or in a trial conducted principally for the benefit of the manufacturer 
or distributor have the right to sue for negligence.96 Treatment 
injuries that are compensable are defined as “adverse medical events 
 
87. Id. at 19. 
88. Id. 
89. Id. at 33. 
90. Id. at 39. 
91. Id. at 42. 
92. See id. at 51-53 (reducing the remedy by “one twentieth of the base 
amount under the National Insurance Act (1962:381)” under section 9 
and an additional 15% under section 16). 
93. Bismark & Paterson, supra note 46, at.278. 
94. HEALTH RESEARCH COUNCIL OF NEW ZEALAND, GUIDELINES ON ETHICS IN 
HEALTH RESEARCH 1, 31 (2005), http://www.hrc.govt.nz/news-and-
publications/publications/ethics-and-regulatory. 
95. Id. 
96. Id. at 32. 
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that must be causally linked to the treatment (but do not require a 
finding of fault) and are not a necessary part or ordinary consequence 
of the treatment.”97 Treatment injuries do not include those due to 
the participant’s underlying health condition, those solely attributable 
to resource allocation decisions, or those due to the participant’s 
“unreasonably withholding or delaying their consent to treatment.”98 
Covered injuries include death, physical injury, mental injury suffered 
by a person because of physical injury, and damage to dentures or 
prostheses.99 
Claims under the system are processed through the Accident 
Compensation Corporation (ACC) national claims unit.100 If 
participants are unsatisfied with the determination of their claim, 
they may request a review of the claim and also retain a right of 
appeal to a court.101 Under the Act, treatment and rehabilitation 
“includes the cost of pharmaceuticals, disability aids, child care, home 
modifications, and vocational retraining.”102 Most health care 
treatment costs are already covered by the country’s universal health 
care system.103 Compensation for lost earnings includes “weekly 
compensation of 80 percent of the claimant’s earnings at the time of 
injury, up to a set maximum,” and lump sum compensation up to a 
set cap is available for injuries resulting in permanent impairment.104 
Support for dependents in the event of a participant’s death is also 
available.105 Since 2005, New Zealand does not use degree of injury 
when determining whether an injury is compensable.106 Of course, the 
level of compensation available depends on the degree of impairment 
suffered.107 
 
97. Id. at 31. 
98. New Zealand Injury Prevention, Rehabilitation, and Compensation Act, 
Public Act 2005 No. 2 § 32(4), 47th Parliament (N.Z. 2005) available at 
http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/2005/0045/latest/DLM34708
4.html?search=sw_096be8ed80ce33e0_research_25_se&p=1 (last 
visited Apr. 18, 2014). 
99. Id. at §26(1). 
100. Bismark & Paterson, supra note 46, at 280. 
101. Id. 
102. Id. 
103. Id. 
104. Id. at 280-81. 
105. Id. at 281. 
106. Id. at 280 (describing adoption of “treatment injury” in the 2005 
reforms). 
107. See id. at 280-81. 
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New Zealand’s public compensation system notwithstanding, the 
New Zealand Researched Medicines Industry has promulgated its own 
guidelines that are modeled on those of the ABPI.108 The guidelines 
require payment of appropriate compensation (no less than that 
available under the ACC) on a no-fault basis to research participants 
whose injuries are due—on the balance of the probabilities—to their 
participation in a clinical trial.109 Injuries due to the failure of the 
studied product to have its intended effect, administration of licensed 
medications or placebos in the control arm, departures from the 
agreed protocol, wrongful conduct by a third party, or contributory 
negligence by the participant are not covered.110 This agreement 
voluntarily shifts the cost of compensation for industry-sponsored 
trials to industry rather than to the government of New Zealand. 
Sweden and New Zealand’s approaches include several elements 
that should be incorporated into any compensation system. 
Importantly, both systems include an initial determination by an 
expert in the field, a uniform system of compensation that is objective 
and easily applicable, and procedural protections including a right to 
appeal.111 Both systems have thorough statutory and regulatory 
underpinnings that clearly define (1) the class of eligible claimants, 
(2) which injuries should be covered, and (3) what remedies are 
available.112 While the approaches of both Sweden and New Zealand 
come from a context in which broad social welfare programs exist, 
their methods for sorting out thorny issues such as causation should 
be considered when deciding what a no-fault research related injury 
compensation system in the United States might look like.113  
108. Regulation of Clinical Trials, MEDICINES N.Z., 
http://www.medicinesnz.co.nz/clinical-trials/ (last visited Apr. 18, 
2014). 
109. RESEARCHED MEDICINES INDUS. ASS’N OF N.Z., RESEARCHED MEDICINES 
INDUSTRY GUIDELINES ON CLINICAL TRIALS COMPENSATION FOR INJURY 
RESULTING FROM PARTICIPATION IN AN INDUSTRY-SPONSORED CLINICAL 
TRIAL, §3, at 3 (Aug. 2008), available at 
http://www.medicinesnz.co.nz/assets/Uploads/compensation-guidelines-
0808-final.pdf. 
110. Id. This should be contrasted with the approach taken in India’s 2013 
regulations, which do require compensation for the failure of the 
intervention to have its intended effect, departure from the agreed 
protocol, wrongful conduct of investigators, and in spite of any potential 
contributory negligence by the participant/subject. See GSR 53(e), 
supra note 54. 
111. See supra notes 80, 94, 98, 100 and accompanying text. 
112. See id. 
113. Indeed, some commentators have argued that Sweden’s system should 
be replicated in the United States. Allen B Kachalia et al., Beyond 
Negligence: Avoidability and Medical Injury Compensation, 66 SOC. SCI. 
MED. 387, 387 (2008).  
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7. Lessons from the International Community 
Examples from the international community illustrate the fact 
that the most complete frameworks for compensation of research 
related injuries define injuries using all four regulatory elements: 
cause, type, degree, and remedy. Considering all four elements is 
important because any system that discounts one or more of them 
lacks the definitional clarity that is necessary for a compensation 
system to be both ethically grounded and practically functional. 
Systems that have less well-rounded definitions of what injuries are 
compensable often leave the definitional questions to insurers or other 
non-state parties which gives those parties the power to limit the 
criteria for compensation in ways that are inconsistent with the 
justifications underlying a compensation requirement.114 A clear 
definition of compensable injury that incorporates all four regulatory 
elements gives research participants notice of what injuries will be 
covered and to what extent.115 A clear definition also has the 
advantage of ensuring that like cases are treated alike, and that 
participants with similar injuries are not treated differently based on 
arbitrary factors like the location of the study or a lack of guidance. 
The problems associated with a lack of definitional clarity are 
evident in the American approach to compensation for research 
related injuries. The Common Rule requires only that research 
participants be informed as to whether compensation is available, and 
it does not even attempt to define what would constitute a 
compensable injury.116 As a result, the question is left to individual 
institutions and insurers, resulting in wide variability in the remedies 
available. 
B. Domestic Compensation Systems 
The United States has no uniform requirement for compensation 
of research related injuries.117 The Code of Federal Regulations 
requires only that research participants be made aware of whether 
compensation is available for research related injuries during the 
informed consent process.118 Different institutions within the United 
 
114. See Larkin, supra note 57. 
115. See Leslie Meltzer Henry et al., Just Compensation: A No-Fault 
Proposal for Research Related Injuries (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript 
at 20) (on file with the author). 
116. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a)(6) (2013). 
117. Id. (“For research involving more than minimal risk, an explanation as 
to whether any compensation and an explanation as to whether any 
medical treatments are available if injury occurs and, if so, what they 
consist of, or where further information may be obtained.”). 
118. Id. 
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States therefore create and implement their own compensation 
policies.119 The lack of uniform agreement on compensation has led to 
widespread variation in the availability of compensation for research 
related injuries.120 In the past twelve years, there has been virtually no 
change in the number of institutions offering compensation for 
research related injuries in the United States.121 It continues to be the 
case that, of the institutions for which data is available, more than 
half offer no compensation and only 5 percent offer unconditional 
compensation.122 The result of this patchwork approach to 
compensation is that research participants’ ability to receive 
compensation for research related injuries is almost entirely dependent 
on where they are enrolled in research.123 This is even true among 
participants enrolled at different research sites in the same trial.124 
Within institutions, the availability of compensation may depend 
on the sponsor of the clinical trial.125 Many academic institutions that 
host clinical trials require industry sponsors to provide compensation 
for research related injuries, but do not require government or non-
profit sponsors to do the same.126 Because there is no reliable no-fault 
mechanism for compensation of research related injuries, most 
participants must turn to the tort system in hope of recovery.127 The 
tort system is widely regarded as inadequate to meet the need for 
compensation for research related injuries because it requires proof of 
culpable conduct on the part of sponsors or investigators and there 
are numerous other barriers to compensation for many classes of 
research participants.128 
The availability of coverage varies widely among institutions that 
provide care or compensation for research related injuries. For 
example, the Department of Veterans’ Affairs, National Institutes of 
Health, and the Department of Defense provide free, short-term 
medical care for all research related injuries, but other compensation 
 
119. Resnik et al., supra note 37, at 2.  
120. Id. 
121. Id. at 6. 
122. Id. 
123. Id. at 2. 
124. Id. 
125. See Michael K. Paasche-Orlow & Frederick L Brancati, Assessment of 
Medical School Institutional Review Board Policies Regarding 
Compensation of Subjects for Research-Related Injury, 118 AM. J. MED. 
175, 179 (2005). 
126. Id. 
127. Pike, supra note 15, at 43-44. 
128. Id. 
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is not available.129 Since 2000, Medicare has paid for care for injured 
patient/participants (not healthy volunteers) who are Medicare 
beneficiaries.130 These systems ignore factors related to the type and 
degree of injury and have only a bare-bones causation requirement 
coupled with a specification of the type of remedy available—namely, 
medical care.131 In the wake of the Affordable Care Act, private 
insurers are now also required to pay for participation in clinical trials 
for cancer or similarly life threatening diseases, but whether this 
payment extends to coverage for research related injuries is unclear.132 
Until mid-2014, the University of Washington was widely 
regarded as having one of the most robust systems of compensation 
for research related injury. It defined a research related injury as a 
bodily injury, and stated that: 
[E]xcept in special circumstances, the term does not include 
impairment of mental processes or emotional distress, nor does 
it encompass effects resulting from: (1) injuries from diagnostic 
or therapeutic procedures, either standard or experimental, 
performed as part of patient management; (2) the normal course 
of a disease or condition; or (3) non-compliance with study 
procedures.133 
This is a developed definition that sets forth the type of injury 
covered and some limitations on the cause of the injury.134 
Compensation under the original University of Washington system 
 
129. 38 U.S.C. § 501 (2014); 38 C.F.R. § 17.85 (2014) (“VA medical facilities 
shall provide necessary medical treatment to a research subject injured 
as a result of participation in a research project approved by a VA 
Research and Development Committee and conducted under the 
supervision of one or more VA employees.”). The VA does not cover 
injuries caused by subject non-compliance with study procedures. Id.; 32 
C.F.R. §108.4(i) (2014); U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE 3216.02 26 
(2011), available at 
http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/321602p.pdf; see also 
Pike, supra note 15, at 25. 
130. Pike, supra note 15, at 25. 
131. 38 C.F.R. § 17.85; 32 C.F.R. § 108.4(i). 
132. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg–8 (2012). See also Insurance Coverage for Clinical 
Trial Participants, AM. SOC. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY, 
http://www.asco.org/insurance-coverage-clinical-trial-participants (last 
visited Mar 27, 2015).  
133. UNIV. OF WASH., HUMAN SUBJECTS MANUAL 7, available at 
http://staff.washington.edu/brz/MANUAL/99-VII.htm (last visited 
Apr. 24, 2014). 
134. See id. 
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was limited to the cost of care, and it failed to factor in economic 
damages.135 
The University of Washington system was revised in September 
2014 in part to “accommodate numerous changes in health care 
systems.”136 The changes restrict the availability of compensation to 
only healthy volunteers in clinical trials.137 This removes 
patient/participants from the pool of eligible claimants and precludes 
compensation for most individuals enrolled in research that has a 
prospect of direct medical benefit to the research participant.138 The 
new policy also caps the amount of medical reimbursement at 
$250,000.139 While the change to this policy is understandable in light 
of the current climate of the health care market, it reflects a setback 
for institutions attempting to provide coverage to injured research 
participants.  
As these examples demonstrate, the compensation available to 
American research subjects—when there is compensation at all—is 
similar in structure to that available in much of Europe.140 It is either 
insurance or self-insurance that covers the cost of medical care.141 
American systems largely lack compensation for economic damages 
and long-term disability.142 These systems, for the most part, do not 
attend to all four regulatory elements instead leaving core definitional 
determinations to third parties.  
II. Retrospective Nonmaleficence and Distributive and 
Compensatory Justice as Justifications for 
Compensation  
In the past four decades, a number of scholars have put forth 
justifications for compensating research related injuries.143 
 
135. Id. 
136. Revised Injury Compensation Program, UNIV. OF WASH. HUMAN 
SUBJECTS DIV. (Sept. 15, 2014) 
http://www.washington.edu/research/hsd/announcements/?q=1645. 
137. Id. 
138. Id. 
139. Id. 
140. See, e.g., ABPI Guidelines 2001, supra note 63, (describing sponsor-
based insurance of costs. It is similar to the University of Washington 
system in terms of the structure, but is far more comprehensive in its 
definition of what is covered and in the compensation available). 
141. See supra Part I.A. 
142. See 38 C.F.R. § 17.85; see also 32 C.F.R. § 108.4(j); U.S. DEP’T OF 
DEF., supra note 129, at 26; UNIV. OF WASH, supra note 133, at 8. 
143. See, e.g., Levine & Holder, supra note 39, at 1; see also David B. 
Resnik, Compensation for Research-Related Injuries, Ethical and Legal 
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Justifications have included theories based in beneficence,144 
nonmaleficence,145 distributive justice,146 compensatory justice,147 and 
cost-shifting.148 These proposed justifications often pull in different 
directions and do not always align with the means of compensation 
contemplated.149 The justifications also diverge with respect to the 
definition of what constitutes a research related injury and when such 
an injury should be compensable.150 It is therefore necessary to 
determine which justifications are warranted, and what those 
justifications imply for the definition of a research related injury and 
how that injury should be remedied. This requires reasoning from the 
principles underlying biomedical research ethics and applying them to 
the distinct problem of research related injuries.151 In particular, it is 
important to engage in this exercise to understand what harms 
compensation should address and to ensure that the means of redress 
are consonant with the aims.152 The ethical principles underlying a 
compensation requirement help to define the universe of eligible 
claimants, determine which injuries are covered, and identify the 
appropriate remedy.153 
 
Issues, 27 J. LEG. MED. 263–87 (2006); Henry, supra note 13, at 411-412 
(noting the variety of justifications for compensation that have been put 
forth).  
144. Resnik, supra note 143, at 265-66. 
145. See, e.g., Joffe & Miller, supra note 21, at 36. 
146. U.S. PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, 
supra note 16, at 58. 
147. Levine & Holder, supra note 39, at 343. 
148. See, e.g., Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the 
Law of Torts, 70 YALE L. J. 499, 514 (1961). 
149. See, e.g., Clark C. Havighurst, Compensating Persons Injured in 
Human Experimentation, 169 SCIENCE 153, 153-57 (1970); Alan J. 
Weisbard, On Not Compensating for Bad Outcomes to Biomedical 
Innovation, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 1161, 1167-69 (1987); Henry, supra note 
13, at 412. 
150. See infra Part II. 
151. See, e.g., TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF 
BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 12 (Oxford Univ. Press, 6th ed. 2009). 
152. See, e.g., G. Owen Schaefer & Alan Wertheimer, The Right to Withdraw 
From Research, 20 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 329, 330 (2010) (discussing 
the importance of providing a moral foundation for the right to 
withdraw). 
153. See infra Part III. 
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Obligations to provide compensation154 and care155 to injured 
research subjects can be found in the core ethical principles of 
nonmaleficence (closely linked to, but distinct from, beneficence) and 
justice. As argued below, each principle supports different, though 
overlapping obligations to provide compensation for research related 
injuries, and each principle places the obligation of compensation on a 
different actor.  
A. Retrospectivity, Beneficence, and Nonmaleficence 
Beneficence and nonmaleficence are often regarded as paired 
obligations. Beneficence is a moral obligation to act to benefit 
others.156 The duty of beneficence “rest[s] on the mere fact that there 
are other beings in the world whose condition we can make better.”157 
If not limited in some way, an obligation of beneficence would be 
difficult to apply because it is potentially boundless.158 Stronger duties 
of beneficence may, therefore, arise based on an individual’s role 
relationship; for example, a doctor or a clinical researcher may have 
general duties of beneficence to their patients or research 
participants.159 A general duty of beneficence is applicable in the 
research context, but such a duty does not create an obligation to 
provide compensation for research related injuries.160 This is so 
because the general duty of beneficence can be discharged in other 
ways.161 Broadly put, “rules of beneficence state positive requirements 
of action, need not always be followed impartially, and rarely, if ever, 
provide moral reasons that support legal punishment when agents fail 
 
154. “Compensation” is used throughout this piece to refer to monetary 
compensation, which should include compensation for the cost of 
medical care. 
155. “Care” and “treatment” are used interchangeably throughout this piece 
to refer to medical care. 
156. Ezekiel J. Emanuel et al., What Makes Clinical Research Ethical?, 283 
JAMA 2701, 2706 (2000); BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 151, at 
197. 
157. DAVID DEGRAZIA ET AL, BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 25 (7th ed. 2010) (quoting 
W.D. Ross). 
158. See, e.g., BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 151, at 197-99 
(attempting to narrow and define an obligatory account of beneficence). 
159. See id. at 205. 
160. Henry, supra note 13, at 416. 
161. See Tom Beauchamp, The Principle of Beneficence in Applied Ethics, 
in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 5-6 (Edward N. Zalta 
ed., 2013), available at 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2013/entries/principle-
beneficence/ (last visited Aug. 5, 2014). 
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to abide by the rules.”162 The general duty of beneficence, therefore, 
provides a reason for providing benefit to research subjects, but does 
not specify that the benefit must be in the form of compensation for 
research related injuries.  
Notwithstanding the generally weak form of the duty of 
beneficence, there are some instances in which a strong duty of 
beneficence applies.163 The most widely agreed upon of these is the 
duty to rescue. The duty to rescue requires that an individual “make 
efforts to rescue strangers under conditions of minimal risk.”164 For 
example, consider a case where A is on the bank of a river, and B has 
fallen in. There is a life preserver next to A on the bank of the river 
that A could toss to B (saving B’s life) with little or no risk to A. In 
such a case, the perfect duty of beneficence would counsel that A has 
an obligation to throw the life preserver to B. 
The perfect duty of beneficence found in the duty to rescue does 
not, however, imply an obligation to compensate for research related 
injuries. This is because the payment of compensation is not a rescue 
scenario. The injury has already occurred at the time compensation 
would be given, and any peril from a lack of compensation is not 
imminent. The duty to provide emergent medical care is adequately 
covered by researchers’ obligation of nonmaleficence, and any need for 
compensation is separate and apart from the subject’s medical needs. 
Duties of nonmaleficence, in contrast to those of beneficence, “rest 
on the complementary fact that [one] can also make the condition of 
other beings worse . . . [and can be] summed up under the heading of 
‘not injuring others.’”165 Nonmaleficence in the context of biomedical 
research “requires that researchers who work with human subjects 
strive to minimize, consistent with the scientific aims of their 
research, the risks and burdens their experimental procedures 
impose.”166 Unlike beneficence, a duty of nonmaleficence in research 
specifically requires compensation for injury as a way to minimize the 
risks imposed on subjects.167 Nonmaleficence, as spelled out in greater 
detail below, is both prospective and retrospective; it requires 
 
162. Id. at 5. 
163. Id. at 6. 
164. Id. at 5. 
165. DEGRAZIA ET AL., supra note 157, at 25. 
166. Joffe & Miller, supra note 21, at 36. 
167. BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 151, at 153 (“Obligations of 
nonmaleficence include not only obligations not to inflict harms, but 
also obligations not to impose risks of harm. A person can harm or place 
another person at risk without malicious or harmful intent, and the 
agent of harm may or may not be morally or legally responsible for the 
harms.”). 
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minimization of foreseeable risks of research and also minimization of 
the effects that risk taking has on research subjects. 
The duty of risk minimization is limited, in principle, by the 
requirement that risks be minimized only to the extent consistent 
with the scientific aims of the research.168 The Common Rule, 
recognizing that risk elimination is not feasible, requires only that 
institutional review boards (IRBs) ensure that research presents a 
reasonable risk-benefit profile.169 In particular, it is widely accepted 
that “it is both ethically justifiable and permissible, within 
appropriate limits, to expose research subjects to risks that are 
justified by the value of the knowledge to be gained from the 
research.”170 Reasonable limits on risk minimization may stem from 
concerns about cost, subject autonomy, or scientific integrity. These 
limits notwithstanding, provision of care and compensation is 
necessary to both maximize possible benefits and also minimize 
possible harms.171 It can be accomplished without attempting to 
eliminate risks entirely, or taking the principle of risk minimization to 
an extreme.172  
There are different types of risk to which the principle of 
nonmaleficence and the corresponding duty to minimize risk might 
apply. The two most salient are biomedical and financial. It is well 
accepted that both types of risk should be considered when 
determining which research to undertake, and whether an injured 
participant may be entitled to compensation.173 The boundaries of the 
 
168. See Joffe & Miller, supra note 21, at 36. 
169. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 46.111 (2013) (detailing the Common Rule criteria 
for IRB approval of research); see also DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & 
WELFARE, THE BELMONT REPORT (1979), available at 
http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/humansubjects/guidance/belmont.html#xass
ess; see also the Nuremberg Code, stating “that the degree of risk 
‘should never exceed that determined by the humanitarian importance 
of the problem to be solved by the experiment.’” quoted in Pike, supra 
note 15, at 15. 
170. Joffe & Miller, supra note 21, at 36. 
171. See infra Section II. See also Larkin, supra note 57, at 5. 
172. A full account of the boundaries of an obligation to minimize risks is 
beyond the scope of this article, but it is clear that within those 
boundaries there remains a strong duty to engage in risk minimization, 
and there is a role for compensation to play in fulfilling this duty. 
173. See, e.g., Rid & Wendler, supra note 21, at 149 (stating that “potential 
harms of all types—physical, psychological, social, and economic,” 
should be considered when conducting a risk-benefit analysis), Charles 
Weijer, The Ethical Analysis of Risk, 28(4) J. L., MED. & ETHICS 344, 
346 (2000) (identifying four types of risk: physical, psychological, social, 
and economic); see also Richard S. Saver, Medical Research and 
Intangible Harm, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 941, 944-946 (2006) (discussing 
intangible harms of medical research). 
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duty to minimize risk are somewhat ill-defined, but they do not 
counsel against a definition of risk that encompasses both biomedical 
and financial harm.174 The aim of a definition of risk should be to 
ensure that the risk-benefit calculus accurately reflects the costs of the 
research. Providing prompt medical care minimizes biomedical risks,175 
while paying for that care minimizes financial risks. 176  
Under the current framework for regulation of biomedical 
research, institutional review boards (IRBs) play an important role in 
risk minimization and participant protection.177 They are tasked with 
evaluating the risks and benefits of a proposed study, and with 
ensuring that the research proposed presents a favorable risk-benefit 
profile. In many other countries, IRB178 review includes an assessment 
of whether provision has been made for compensation in the event of 
a research related injury, but in the United States, such an analysis is 
not required.179 IRBs also have a central role in approving the process 
for obtaining informed consent to research and ensuring that potential 
participants are adequately informed of the risks and benefits 
attendant to participation.180 These measures are a form of 
prospective nonmaleficence—the forward-looking minimization of 
possible harms before the research begins. 
Reliance on IRBs to mitigate or eliminate all potential harms of 
research, however, risks overstating both their role and their 
 
174. In fact, the financial risk to research participants has historically been 
considered as a reason for their compensation. See, e.g., Pike, supra note 
15, at 18-20 (examining the historical reasons given for compensation, 
which include concerns over financial harm to research subjects). 
175. Minimization of biomedical risks may also help avert future financial 
risks by avoiding the need for more medical care. 
176. See, e.g., D. R. Vasgird et al., Protecting the Uninsured Human 
Research Subject, 6(6) J. PUB. HEALTH MGMT. PRACTICE 37, 37 (2000). 
See also Resnik, supra note 143, at 266. See also D. U. Himmelstein et 
al., MarketWatch: Illness and Injury as Contributors to Bankruptcy, 2 
HEALTH AFF. W5-63 (2005). 
177. See Emanuel et al., supra note 156, at 2701. 
178. In other countries boards that perform the same function as IRBs may 
go by different names, for example, Research Ethics Committees (RECs) 
or Ethics Committees. See, e.g., Drugs and Cosmetics (First 
Amendment) Rules (2013) GAZETTE OF INDIA, Part II - Section 3 - Sub-
section (i) G.S.R. 53(E). 
179. See, e.g., Medicines for Human Use (Clinical Trials) Regulations, 2004 
S.I. 1031 (U.K.); see also U.S. PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF 
BIOETHICAL ISSUES, supra note 16, at 186-90. 
180. Emanuel et al., supra note 156, at 2701. 
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institutional competence.181 IRB approval alone does not ensure that 
research is conducted in an ethically appropriate manner, or that 
subjects are adequately informed of the risks of participation, 
particularly when explicit consideration of the financial risks of 
participation is not necessarily part of the ethical analysis conducted 
by either researchers or the IRBs that oversee them.182 Provision of 
IRB review of clinical trials does not, therefore, eliminate the need for 
compensation in the case of injury, which provides a different and 
supplemental type of protection. In particular, concerns related to 
retrospective nonmaleficence—mitigating the effect of harm that has 
already occurred—are not incorporated in the current IRB review 
process. 
One objection to the risk-based argument in favor of 
compensation is that subjects who give their informed consent to 
participate in research assume the risks inherent in that research and 
make a gift of themselves to society.183 On its face, this argument is 
attractive because people are allowed to assume many risks in their 
day-to-day lives. For example, people are permitted to assume the 
risk of sports such as skiing and commonly waive liability before they 
take to the slopes.184 Underlying the assumption of risk argument and 
its appeal is the notion that people may freely assume risks when they 
have knowledge of the risks and voluntarily give their informed 
consent to undertake them.185 Arguments about assumption of risk 
 
181. See Seema K. Shah, Outsourcing Ethical Obligations: Should the Revised 
Common Rule Address the Responsibilities of Investigators and 
Sponsors?, 41 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 397, 397 (2013). 
182. See id. 
183. See U.S. PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL 
PROBLEMS, supra note 14, at 53-56. It should be acknowledged that this 
argument may be more salient in the case of altruistic research 
participation and that it is potentially inapplicable in “net benefit” 
research where the subject at the time of enrollment has a prospect for 
direct biomedical benefit from clinical trial participation. In such cases 
there is considerable doubt as to whether the research participant 
intends to make a gift of him or herself to society.  
184. See generally C. Connor Crook, JD, Validity and Enforceability of 
Liability Waivers on Ski Lift Tickets, 28 CAMPBELL L. REV. 107, 107–
121 (2005) (surveying state laws regarding the validity and 
enforceability of lift ticket waivers); see also Karen E. Crummy, 
Colorado Ski Industry Enjoys Protection From Law, Waivers, DENVER 
POST, Mar. 3, 2013, http://www.denverpost.com/ci_22813161/colorado-
ski-industry-enjoys-protection-from-law-waivers. 
185. See U.S. PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, 
supra note 16, at 59. 
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are, however, misapplied to the question of compensation for research 
related injury.186  
Research subjects are not well positioned to make good decisions 
about when to assume risks in research, and when to avoid them. As 
the President’s Commission stated: 
 
[I]n helping to advance research, human subjects sometimes 
place themselves in a position of informational asymmetry, 
where they must rely on the expertise and wisdom of 
researchers, reviewers, funding institutions, and, at times, 
their own physicians to ensure that a research study in 
which they enroll is designed and deployed with their rights 
and welfare in mind.187 
 
Informational asymmetry may mean that subjects do not 
necessarily have a full or accurate appreciation of the risks of the 
research they are participating in, even after they have gone through 
the informed consent process.188 Risks, as they appear in biomedical 
research, “are a function of two more basic components: (1) the 
likelihood that a harmful event or experience will occur as a result of 
an intervention, and (2) the extent to which the event or experience, 
should it occur, sets back the individual participant’s interests.”189 
Risk evaluation requires both an empirical judgment “about how 
robust and relevant the available data are regarding the potential 
harms and benefits of the interventions,” and a normative judgment 
of whether the magnitude of the risk to the individual is justified by 
 
186. The Secretary’s Task Force (1977) concluded that, “informed consent 
does not negate or waive the obligation to provide compensation. The 
case is similar to that of persons who have been injured in the course of 
voluntary military service. The fact that a person has volunteered does 
not eliminate that person’s right to be compensated in the event of 
injury, whether or not the injury was foreseeable. The Task Force agrees 
that consent should not negate the rights of research volunteers. 
Informed consent in the research setting functions as a recognition of 
and a protection for a person’s integrity and autonomy, but does not 
imply a waiver of the right of the person to compensation in the event 
of injury.” HEW SECRETARY’S TASK FORCE ON THE COMPENSATION OF 
INJURED RESEARCH SUBJECTS, supra note 27. 
187. U.S. PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, 
supra note 16, at 70. 
188. See, e.g., U.S. PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL 
PROBLEMS, supra note 14, at 58-59. (“Remote risks of serious harms are 
especially likely to attend experimental procedures. Consent in such 
cases is necessarily somewhat blind, and true appreciation of cases is 
necessarily somewhat blind, and true appreciation of risk is doubtful, 
even for ideally competent subjects.”).  
189. Rid & Wendler, supra note 21, at 148-49. 
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the potential for the research to benefit society.190 There is ample 
room for an individual participant to either misapprehend or 
misevaluate the nature of the known risks of proposed research 
participation, or the likely value of his or her research participation to 
the advancement of medical science.191  
While subjects may not have a full understanding or appreciation 
of the risks of research, sponsors and research institutions are better 
positioned to understand these risks. Current guidelines and standards 
require researchers to weigh the risks of research against the risks of 
“comparator activities,” such as those encountered in daily life or 
ordinary medical care.192 Such an evaluation should consider both the 
physical and economic risks that a given research activity poses.193 
That some financial risk accompanies a research related injury is 
foreseeable by the study sponsor or research institution, and the 
financial risk can be offset by those same institutions that are best 
placed to identify and avoid it.194 Researchers and sponsors have an 
obligation to weigh the risk to individual subjects against the value of 
the research, and will be better able to determine when the risk is 
unacceptably high such that it is not worth conducting the research 
at all.  
Often the full risks of participation in medical research are 
unknown, even to the researchers themselves.195 One way to minimize  
190. Id. at 143. 
191. Id. at 145 (arguing that “[d]etermining that a study achieves a 
minimum level of social value requires detailed knowledge of the 
research topic, as well as knowledge of the scientific methods proposed 
in the study.”). 
192. Annette Rid et al., Evaluating the Risks of Clinical Research, 304 
JAMA 1472, 1472-73 (2010). 
193. Id. 
194. See, e.g. Schaefer & Wertheimer, supra note 152, at 337-38. While 
researchers may not be in a perfect position to make individualized 
judgments about the impact of financial risk on any particular research 
participant, certain generalizations about the impact of financial risk 
may be applicable. For example, low-income or uninsured individuals 
are likely to suffer much more if a financial risk materializes than 
higher-income individuals who may have the ability to take paid sick 
leave or rely on a disability insurance policy. Even with these 
differences, however, the risk mitigation strategy is the same: free care 
and compensation for financial injury should the risk materialize.  
195. See, e.g., D.R. Vasgird et al., supra note 176, at 45; WENDY MARINER, 
COMMITTEE ON ETHICAL AND LEGAL ISSUES RELATING TO THE INCLUSION 
OF WOMEN IN CLINICAL STUDIES & INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, WOMEN AND 
HEALTH RESEARCH: ETHICAL AND LEGAL ISSUES OF INCLUDING WOMEN IN 
CLINICAL STUDIES 117 (1994); U.S. PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE 
STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, supra note 16, at 58; see also U.S. 
PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS, supra 
note 14, at 9-10. 
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the net effects196 of unknown or unknowable risks is to ensure that 
subjects exposed to such risks do not have to pay the full cost of 
treatment if the risks are realized and require medical care.197 Viewed 
this way, the financial risk is separate from the medical risk, and the 
net effects of that risk are subject to mitigation through guaranteed 
compensation. As has been argued in the context of the right to 
withdraw from research, “[g]iven that informed consent is insufficient 
to protect subjects from misjudging the full costs of participating in a 
study, society may prefer to protect individuals from the consequences 
of their nonculpable misjudgments.”198 When reasonable compensation 
for research related injuries is guaranteed, injured research subjects 
are protected from both unforeseen and underappreciated risks. 
Medical care can be incredibly expensive, and, depending on the 
financial resources of the participant, can lead to significant financial 
harm, such as bankruptcy.199 Compensation is therefore aligned with 
the requirements of the principle of nonmaleficence as applied in 
biomedical research. No other approach can adequately shield 
research subjects from bearing the full weight of unforeseen or 
underestimated risks while simultaneously providing a financial 
incentive for study sponsors and institutions to engage in proactive 
risk minimization. 
Even a general duty to minimize risks, aside from the issue of 
compensation, is open to criticism. Benjamin Sachs argues that the 
requirement of risk minimization is an example of bioethics 
“exceptionalism” because we do not require risk minimization in 
analogous relationships, such as those between employers and 
employees or volunteer organizers and volunteers.200 In particular, 
Sachs contends that the “distinction between necessary and 
unnecessary risks is largely absent from our moral reasoning about the 
employer-employee relationship,” and that we primarily concern 
ourselves with whether employees are adequately compensated for 
 
196. The net effects of a risk are the ways in which the risk materializes for 
the affected individual, for example, by causing an injury that requires 
further medical care or days off from work. 
197. See, e.g. Resnik, supra note 143, at 266 (relying on beneficence as the 
root of the same risk minimization obligation and arguing that “[i]f a 
subject has been harmed by a research-related injury, beneficence 
obligates researchers to try to minimize the additional harms that may 
occur to the subject as a result of the injury. Researchers can fulfill this 
obligation by providing the subject with medical care or financial 
compensation.”). 
198. Schaefer & Wertheimer, supra note 152, at 338. 
199. Himmelstein, supra note 176. 
200. Benjamin Sachs, The Exceptional Ethics of the Investigator-Subject 
Relationship, 35 J. MED. PHILOS. 64, 70 (2010). 
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taking those risks.201 While Sachs concedes that the duty to minimize 
risks and concern over necessary versus unnecessary risks reemerges in 
the context of volunteer-organizer/volunteer relationships, he 
concludes that exceptionalism of this type is difficult to defend 
because it fails to treat morally analogous relationships alike with the 
result of imposing restrictions on research that are not ethically 
necessary.202  
Sachs’s argument is flawed because it is based on a faulty 
premise. Society does require risk management in the employment 
context. Regulatory bodies like OSHA regularly mitigate the risks to 
which employers may expose their employees.203 Workmen’s 
compensation reduces the financial hazards associated with irreducible 
workplace risks.204 When a job is viewed as unacceptably risky, it is 
open to judgment that it should either be changed to reflect a more 
favorable risk-benefit profile, or it should be discontinued.205 The 
example by which Sachs chooses to illustrate his point is particularly 
demonstrative. He cited the National Football League as an example 
of allowing individuals to knowingly accept the risks of a job, without 
any obligation on the part of the employer to minimize those risks.206 
As the recent scandal over the risk of traumatic brain injury in 
football demonstrates, there is a concern that the risks of head injury 
are not “necessary” to the sport of football, and a legal and ethical 
obligation has been placed on the NFL to study and minimize the 
risks of concussion going forward, and to compensate players who are 
currently suffering from the lasting effects of traumatic brain injury.207 
 
201. Id. 
202. Id. at 70-71, 75. 
203. See U.S. DEP’T LABOR, OSHA LAW AND REGULATIONS, available at 
https://www.osha.gov/law-regs.html (last visited Oct. 18, 2014). 
204. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, WORKERS’ COMPENSATION, available at 
http://www.dol.gov/dol/topic/workcomp (last visited Oct. 18, 2014).  
205. Of course, it is possible that we as a society allow people to take on 
greater risks in the employment context than as participants in 
biomedical research because individuals may be financially compensated 
for taking riskier jobs. It is much more contentious, however, whether ex 
ante financial compensation is appropriate to offset the risks of research 
participation. See generally Christine Grady, Payment of Clinical 
Research Subjects, 115 J. CLIN. INVEST. 1581, 1581 (2005).  
206. Sachs, supra note 200. 
207. See Ron Winslow, NFL Union Funds Study of Injury Risk, WALL ST. J., 
Jan. 29, 2013, 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323644904578270212095
595572 (last visited Apr. 22, 2015). See, e.g., Editorial: What Players’ 
Brain Damage Will Cost the NFL, CHI. TRIB., July 15, 2014, 
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/editorials/ct-national-
 
Health Matrix·Volume 25·2015  
Defining Compensable Injury in Biomedical Research 
342 
The requirement to minimize risks in the researcher-participant 
relationship is not, therefore, an example of bioethics exceptionalism, 
but rather a specific execution of a principle broadly applicable to 
similar relationships in our society. 
Nonmaleficence, as argued above, creates an obligation to provide 
compensation for research related injuries. The next question to be 
answered is then, who bears the duty generated by the principle of 
nonmaleficence? As previously argued, nonmaleficence requires first 
that those conducting or sponsoring the research not intentionally 
cause harm, and second, that the risks of participation in research be 
minimized.208 Nonmaleficence, as applied in the research setting, holds 
that there is a stronger duty to act when there is a duty of care.209 It 
therefore places the duty to compensate research subjects at the feet 
of the sponsors of medical research and the institutions that conduct 
it. Of the possible duty bearers, these entities are best positioned to 
minimize the risks to research participants because they have the best 
understanding of the risks inherent in the research and the 
evidentiary base underlying the testing of any intervention. They are 
also in the best position to make appropriate financial or risk 
spreading arrangements so that the net effects of risk may be 
mitigated rather than being borne entirely by the injured research 
participants.  
B. Justice 
An obligation to provide compensation for research related injury 
is also supported by the principle of justice. In particular, three 
different formulations of the principle of justice—compensatory, 
distributive and reparative—support a requirement for compensation. 
Underlying these concerns is the fact that “[u]nintended harm is 
inevitable in the course of human subjects research,” and although the 
benefits of research are shared broadly, the risks fall almost 
exclusively upon those who volunteer to be research subjects.210  
Distributive justice “refers to fair, equitable, and appropriate 
distribution [of resources that must] be determined by justified norms 
that structure the terms of social cooperation.”211 As applied to 
compensation for research related injury, it suggests that benefits 
should be distributed in a manner that accounts for the 
 
football-league-concussion-edit-20140715-story.html (last visited Oct. 18, 
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209. See, e.g., Joffe & Miller, supra note 21, at 36. 
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disproportionate burden borne by some research subjects. 
Compensatory justice, in a related vein, is concerned with 
compensation for risks undertaken on behalf of others.212 Reparative 
justice, by contrast, is a form of corrective justice that is intended to 
repair an injury wrongfully caused by the actions of another.213 
Discussed below are the ways in which the different justice concerns 
translate into an obligation to compensate participants for research 
related injuries. 
1. Distributive and Compensatory Justice  
At its core, the principle of distributive justice is concerned with 
the distribution of scarce benefits in competitive environments, and 
with the distribution of burdens that are borne by a subset of an 
overtly similar class.214 In a more particularized formulation, “[t]he 
principle of distributive justice requires that those who take the risks 
of research should receive the benefits.”215 As Wendy Mariner 
explains:  
Compensation is a means of redressing the imbalance between 
the risks undertaken by research subjects and the benefits. Since 
most legitimate research is intended to benefit society as a 
whole, the subject assumes the risks for society’s sake (some 
would say making a gift to society). Therefore, society has a 
moral obligation to make the injured subject whole by 
compensating those who took the risks and suffered thereby.216 
Risks are theoretically distributed evenly among research 
participants selected without prejudice. The harm to a participant 
who is actually injured, however, may be either ameliorated or 
exacerbated by the participant’s background conditions. In countries 
and health systems where there is no social safety net and the cost of 
medical care is borne largely by the individual participant, the 
magnitude of the risk of any given research injury is dependent on 
individual factors that are to some extent uncontrollable by the 
research sponsor or institution. For example, the cost of care for a 
research related injury may have a disproportionately large impact on 
an individual who does not have many financial resources, or who is 
 
212. See Henry, supra note 13, at 417. 
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215. MARINER, supra note 195, at 116. 
216. Id. 
Health Matrix·Volume 25·2015  
Defining Compensable Injury in Biomedical Research 
344 
uninsured.217 Health insurance also does not guarantee that a patient 
will not suffer significant costs associated with a research related 
injury, as coverage and coverage caps will vary between plans.218 Even 
in countries with partial or full safety nets, available medical care 
may not make the injured participant whole again in light of other 
costs of the injury, such as time lost from work or continuing 
disability.219 The level of risk undertaken by each participant in a 
study could be more evenly distributed through provision of financial 
compensation for research related injuries because external financial 
factors would be controlled for, leaving the inevitable biomedical 
differences as the primary source of differences in individual risk 
burden. 
Compensatory justice has slightly different theoretical 
underpinnings than distributive justice, but reaches much the same 
result. Compensatory justice is rooted in the principle of fairness and 
aims to compensate individuals for risks undertaken on behalf of 
others.220 This is the justification that has historically found the most 
support in the work of presidential commissions,221 and it is the 
justification for well-established compensation systems currently in 
place in the United States. It “does not presuppose wrongful injury 
[(there is no award of damages)], but is a matter of restitution and 
restoration sometimes by the community as a whole . . . .”222 
Compensatory justice takes “account of a previous state of affairs and 
attempt[s] to restore a ‘fallen’ individual or group to it.”223 
Compensatory justice also does not take into account the motivation 
of the research participant when determining whether compensation is 
owed.224 This is so because whether the participant enrolls for self-
interested or civic-minded reasons, the public benefit produced by the 
 
217. See Himmelstein, supra note 176. 
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scheme for compensating medical injuries through both treatment and 
financial remedies).  
220. James F. Childress, Compensating Injured Research Subjects: I. The 
Moral Argument, 6(6) HASTINGS CENT. REP. 21, 22 (1976). See Henry et 
al., supra note 115, at 12. 
221. Henry, supra note 13, at 417. 
222. Childress, supra note 220. 
223. Id. 
224. Id. 
Health Matrix·Volume 25·2015  
Defining Compensable Injury in Biomedical Research 
345 
advancement of medical science is the same.225 The results of the 
research are similarly irrelevant to the question of compensation 
because even studies that have negative results produce a social 
benefit.226  
The compensatory justice account of compensation for research 
related injury provides a convincing rationale for existing programs 
that provide benefits to individuals who are injured in the service of 
society. 227 Two salient examples are the provision of benefits to 
veterans and the creation of the National Vaccine Injury 
Compensation Program (VICP).228 Veterans in the United States are 
entitled to financial compensation for disabilities that are either 
caused or aggravated by their military service.229 This benefit has 
historically applied to both draftees and volunteers alike.230 The 
VICP, on the other hand, compensates individuals who are injured 
due to vaccination. The program provides compensation to 
individuals harmed in the process of creating herd immunity through 
widespread vaccination, which benefits to the public at large.231  
Each of these programs is funded in a different manner, but they 
have the same underlying ethical justification, namely, when 
individuals have benefitted society and become injured in the process, 
these systems work to spread the costs of compensating the injured 
parties among the class of beneficiaries. Similarly, in research, science 
and the development of new therapeutic treatments would not be able 
to go forward without the participation of human research subjects. 
With research comes an “ineliminable burden” of risk.232 Risks borne 
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by research participants to benefit society at large should be both 
minimized and distributed fairly.233 Compensation for research related 
injury is a risk spreading mechanism because it forces society at large 
to bear a portion of the cost of that risk of injury.234  
While the obligation created by distributive and compensatory 
justice is spread more broadly than the one created by the principle of 
nonmaleficence, it demands less of each individual on whom it falls.235 
A duty of this nature would be satisfied by some publicly funded 
compensation system akin to veterans’ benefits or the VICP. A 
compensation system that is based on a theory of distributive and 
compensatory justice should therefore place at least some of the 
burden of payment for research related injury on the public at large.  
The burden of distributive and compensatory justice also falls 
upon the shoulders of research sponsors and institutions to the extent 
that these entities benefit financially or otherwise from the 
commercialization of the products of biomedical research. Because 
these entities reap a portion of the financial benefits of a new drug, 
device, or intervention, they hold an obligation in distributive and 
compensatory justice to the individuals who suffer a research related 
injury.236 
2. Reparative Justice 
Reparative justice is based on the premise that a party that has 
injured another is responsible for correcting or mitigating the harm 
caused. Currently, compensation for research related injury is often 
left to the legal system in the form of civil tort suits.237 This is a 
classic embodiment of the principle of reparative justice because “[t]he 
tort system requires injured research subjects to prove not only that 
 
(Nov. 17, 2011), available at 
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the research study caused their injury, but that fault for the injury 
lies with the research team, pharmaceutical company, or institutional 
sponsor.”238 While the reparative justice framework provides an 
adequate justification for compensation where the research participant 
has been harmed because of some sort of misconduct by the sponsor, 
institution, or researcher, it does not address the issue of 
compensation where a research related injury is not the product of 
negligence or an intentional tort.239 Given the uncertainty inherent in 
conducting research on novel medical interventions or strategies, or 
applications of existing interventions or strategies, injuries will occur 
in research even when sponsors and researchers do nothing wrong.240 
Such injuries do not create a claim in reparative justice and are not 
susceptible to redress through the tort system.241 Claims that are 
based in negligence or malfeasance should be channeled into the tort 
system for appropriate redress, but claims that are not the product of 
wrongful action ought to be dealt with through an alternative no-fault 
compensation system. 
C. Pragmatic Reasons for Compensating Research Related Injuries 
In addition to the ethical reasons for providing compensation for 
research related injuries, there are also practical benefits. In 
particular, compensation could have the positive effect of increasing 
enrollment in human subjects research.242 Research is necessary for the 
advancement of medical treatment and care, and even studies that do 
not produce positive outcomes or results contribute to the knowledge 
base available to future researchers.243 Compensation for research 
related injury gives participation in any given study a more favorable 
personal risk-benefit profile and may remove one large disincentive to 
participation—the possibility of having to pay for medical 
treatment.244 A uniform policy favoring compensation would also have 
the benefit of harmonizing the different compensation policies 
currently in existence and providing research subjects with a universal 
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baseline level of protection that does not depend on the location of 
the study.245 
As Alex John London has observed, “research is an enterprise 
that uses social resources to provide social benefits.”246 London argues 
that public confidence in research is reduced when the problems of 
“antipathy, disrespect, lack of social value, or unfair division of social 
resources” arise in the research process.247 In particular, antipathy, as 
used by London, “refers to a manifest lack of concern for the health, 
welfare, and broader interests of research participants.”248 By failing 
to provide compensation for research related injuries, the current 
research enterprise exhibits just such antipathy toward the individuals 
who volunteer to become research subjects. Creation of a national no-
fault compensation system might, therefore, have the added benefit of 
fostering public support for the continuation of the research 
enterprise.249 
D. Application  
As demonstrated above, the justifications for compensating 
subjects for research related injuries place the duty to provide 
compensation on different actors. The principles of nonmaleficence 
and reparative justice place the duty at the feet of the research 
sponsors, institutions, and investigators. By contrast, the principles of 
distributive and compensatory justice place the duty on the 
beneficiaries of the research, be that either society at large or the 
research sponsors and institutions that stand to profit from the 
eventual commercialization of any knowledge gained by the research 
enterprise. A compensation system can be designed to allocate the 
primary burden of compensation among different potential duty 
bearers. It need not, however, always stay there. Primary duty 
bearers may distribute the duty among other potential duty bearers. 
For example, if sponsors are responsible for providing compensation, 
the cost of that compensation may be built in to the market price of 
the therapeutic intervention that the research helped to produce. If 
research institutions are responsible, the cost may be built in to the 
charges they pass on to sponsors (and thus distributed to the public 
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through the pricing of any intervention), or incorporated in the cost 
of receiving medical care at that institution.  
In light of the multiple ways that the burden of compensation 
could be distributed, any framework for compensation should 
incorporate consideration of the justifications for compensation and 
where those justifications place the duty to compensate. Reparative 
justice, when it applies, provides the strongest justification for 
compensating research related injuries. It is a foundational principle of 
the tort system and a widely accepted principle in law and ethics that 
one who wrongfully injures another has an obligation to make that 
person whole.250 Cases in which reparative justice requires 
compensation are, however, relatively rare because the injured party 
must prove that the injury was wrongful.251 A wrongful injury is one 
that is the product of a culpable state of mind—negligence, 
recklessness, or intent—on the part of the one who causes the injury. 
These cases are appropriately dealt with through the tort system, 
which is designed to provide a mechanism for those who have been 
wronged to seek monetary damages from the one who wronged 
them.252 Any duty to compensate based in reparative justice, 
therefore, should not be dealt with in a new compensation system, but 
would be better handled by reforms to the existing tort framework. 
A recent article enumerates the many barriers to compensation 
for research related injury under the current tort law framework.253 It 
argues that the tort system “is an unsatisfactory compensation 
mechanism for almost all litigants” because it “is time-consuming, 
adversarial, expensive, and has a tendency to under-compensate most 
injured participants while over-compensating a select few.”254 Injured 
research participants face high barriers to recovery due to lack of 
established case law and difficulty proving a breach of a legal duty 
owed to them or that the research intervention caused their injury.255 
Participants in federally conducted research or international research 
face additional statutory barriers to recovery.256 The net result is that 
“[u]nder the current negligence approach, only an extremely limited 
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subset of injured research participants can bring a successful tort 
lawsuit: those who were injured in research that did not comply with 
federal regulations, when the injury arose due to the researchers fault, 
and in jurisdictions where research participants are not precluded 
from recovering by a signed informed consent document.”257  
While those who are able to bring a successful suit under the 
current tort law framework have a clear claim to compensation in 
reparative justice, the scope of the reparative justice obligation is 
broader than what the current tort law framework allows. In order to 
match the scope of the obligation, the tort framework would need to 
undergo reforms, including removing some of the current barriers to 
suit in research related injury cases.258 The tort system would then 
provide an adequate means of dealing with those cases where a 
research subject has been wrongfully injured due to some culpable act 
of a researcher, institution, or sponsor. The vast majority of research 
injuries where there is no culpable conduct cannot, however, be 
adequately accommodated under a tort law framework and should, 
instead, be subject to some form of no-fault compensation.259 
In contrast to the limited scope of reparative justice, 
nonmaleficence provides a compelling justification for providing 
compensation for research related injuries in the majority of cases. 
Nonmaleficence, grounded in the relationship between sponsors, 
researchers, institutions, and subjects, is intertwined with the 
obligations already undertaken by sponsors, researchers, and 
institutions in other parts of the research enterprise. For example, the 
duty to minimize risks is incorporated into IRB review of research 
protocols, and the requirement that a protocol must be scientifically 
valid. There is no morally justified reason for the obligation to 
minimize risks to end with prospective physical or medical risks and 
not include the financial risks of research related injury. Furthermore, 
the relationship between the sponsors, institutions, researchers and 
subjects gives weight to a duty to act.260 Finally, nonmaleficence 
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creates a strong obligation to act because the ones who bear the duty 
are also those who are in a position to either mitigate or exacerbate 
harm and risk of harm to the participant during his or her enrollment 
in research. 
In examining the principles underlying an obligation to provide 
compensation for research related injury, nonmaleficence and justice 
create complementary duties for sponsors, institutions, and 
researchers. In particular, sponsors, institutions, and researchers have 
a strong duty to compensate participants under a reparative justice 
model when they have caused the injury. Similarly, those entities 
have a well-founded duty to provide compensation under a theory of 
distributive and compensatory justice because they benefit financially 
and professionally from the participants’ enrollment in research.261 
Although sponsors, institutions, and researchers generally have a 
vested interest in any given trial, assessing the total benefit of 
research to these actors is a complex task. After all, a trial may fail, 
giving no direct benefits to the sponsor, institution, or researcher 
involved, but providing information that may be useful to others 
involved in the research enterprise at some future time. At this point, 
it is sufficient to recognize that these actors have a definite stake in 
the continuation of research, but that the benefit to them may vary in 
degree based on many factors, including, but not limited to the type 
of actor and the outcome of the research.262 
The duty of the general public, grounded in both distributive and 
compensatory justice, is difficult to compare with the duties held by 
sponsors, institutions, and researchers because the benefits accruing to 
each party are largely incommensurable.263 Commercial sponsors of 
 
humanity to go to the aid of another human being who is in danger, 
even if the other is in danger of losing his life.”).  
261. See Resnik, supra note 138, at 266, 269. Financial benefit is the more 
important metric here because this article is chiefly concerned with 
monetary compensation for economic harms, including, but not limited 
to, the cost of care and of lost wages due to disability. See also 
Childress, supra note 220. 
262. Compare Listing Revenues and Profits for Major Pharmaceutical 
Companies, FORBES FORTUNE 500, available at 
http://fortune.com/fortune500/2013/wal-mart-stores-inc-1 (last accessed 
Mar. 19, 2015), with Matthew Herper, How Much Does Pharmaceutical 
Innovation Cost?, FORBES (Aug. 11, 2013) available at 
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the device, drug, or intervention receive a large portion of the benefit 
generated, namely the profits. Public or non-profit sponsors may 
receive a lesser financial benefit, but they may gain other rewards 
from research, such as reputational gains and the satisfaction of seeing 
progress made in the area the sponsor chooses to focus on. Similarly, 
research institutions and researchers receive benefits from biomedical 
research—namely funding and prestige—which are less easily 
measured than pure financial benefits. These types of actors have a 
large stake in any given project, as well as an undeniable interest in 
seeing the continuation of the research enterprise. The public at large 
benefits immensely from the existence of the research enterprise as a 
whole, but public benefit is not necessarily contingent upon the 
success of any particular study.264 As Alan Wertheimer has eloquently 
stated in response to Hans Jonas’s famous claim that progress is 
optional, “one person’s ‘optional progress’ is another person’s life or 
body.”265 The research enterprise produces a vast social good because 
it transforms yesterday’s experimental drugs, devices, and 
interventions into today’s standard therapies.266 It is difficult to 
compare the value of a drug to an individual whose life it saves with 
the value of that same drug to the company that reaps the profits. It 
can, nonetheless, be determined that the public as a whole receives 
great benefit from research and should therefore, under a theory of 
compensatory justice, bear some of the burden of compensation for 
research related injuries. 
The benefits of the research enterprise are spread widely across a 
number of actors who have varying degrees of obligation to 
compensate the individuals who have been injured during the research 
process. In light of the different obligations created, a compensation 
system guided by the principles of nonmaleficence and justice should 
take into account the many beneficiaries of research, and spread the 
burden of compensation accordingly. Such a model should have the 
cost of compensation borne by all those with a stake in the research 
enterprise including sponsors (both private and public), institutions, 
researchers, and, of course, the public at large.  
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III. Using Ethical Justifications to Define 
“Compensable Injury” 
A. Causation 
All justifications for compensation of research related injury 
incorporate a requirement of causation. A duty of risk-minimization 
based in nonmaleficence requires compensation only for those injuries 
that foreseeably arise as part of the research process.267 The 
justification for this approach is that the duty bearers within the 
research enterprise cannot be held responsible for risks outside of 
those that they have an obligation to minimize.268 This requires that 
compensation be limited to those injuries that are caused by the 
subject’s participation in research.269 Similarly, a duty based in 
distributive and compensatory justice requires compensation for those 
injuries occasioned by the research participant’s decision to 
participate in biomedical research, thereby foregoing the standard of 
care.270 It is this decision that produces the benefits of medical 
research and scientific progress that are received by both the research 
enterprise and society as a whole.271 Injuries that can be traced back 
to that decision should be compensated as research related injuries. 
Finally, the duty of reparative justice requires compensation for those 
injuries that have been caused by the negligence or malfeasance of 
someone within the research enterprise.272  
The path that causation must tread in these cases is analogous to 
that required by courts in evaluating claims of negligence.273 As 
illustrated above, different international systems of compensation 
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more appropriately addressed as limitations on the scope of 
responsibility. See, e.g. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & 
EMOT. HARM ch. 6, spec. note (2010). 
270. See supra Part II. 
271. See supra Part II. 
272. See supra Part II. 
273. See, e.g., H.L.A. HART & TONY HONORÉ, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 20 (2d 
ed. 1985). 
Health Matrix·Volume 25·2015  
Defining Compensable Injury in Biomedical Research 
354 
require different proof of causation when it comes to research related 
injuries. In order to more clearly determine what it means for an 
injury to be caused by research, it is necessary to look at theories of 
causation more broadly and to examine causation in the research 
context. In particular, causation cannot be isolated from an analysis 
of whether participants received the appropriate standard of care. In 
so-called therapeutic research, it is often difficult to determine 
whether a patient-subject’s worsening condition is the result of a 
research related injury or of the natural progression of the individual’s 
underlying disease state.274 These considerations must be incorporated 
into a comprehensive system for determining which injuries can 
justifiably be said to have been caused by the research.  
1. A Theory of Causation 
The concept of causation is deceptively difficult. Although the 
language that is used when discussing causation is both intuitive and 
intended to be interpreted by lay people, an analysis of causation as it 
is used in the law leads to complex questions about both the origin 
and the attribution of events. At this point, it is useful to draw upon 
the work of H.L.A. Hart and Tony Honoré, who have undertaken a 
thorough examination of causation in the law.275 Their analysis of 
causation aims to explicate what separates a cause from a mere 
condition of the occurrence of an event, and it also explores the 
conditions under which the determination that an event is the cause 
of another leads to an attribution of responsibility for the 
consequences of that event. 
a. Causes and Conditions 
Causes, as they are used in the legal or historical lexicon, must be 
distinguished from the causal concepts used by scientists and 
philosophers.276 In general, lawyers are concerned with the attribution 
of responsibility for the consequences of an action.277 Hart and Honoré 
draw upon the work of Hume and Mill to conclude that for any given 
occurrence, a number of factors are necessary to produce the ultimate 
 
274. See Henry et al., supra note 115, at 5. (“[P]roving causation is 
problematic for research participants, many of whom suffer from 
underlying medical conditions that make it difficult to determine 
whether their alleged injury is the result of the experimental 
intervention or their disease.”). 
275. See generally HART & HONORÉ, supra note 273. 
276. Id. at 17-20. 
277. Id. at 20. (“[T]he lawyer, the historian, and the plain man accept the 
doctrine that an event of a given kind may be produced by different 
causes. They are perfectly prepared to treat, for example, death, as 
caused by poisoning, sometimes by starvation, and sometimes by 
shooting . . . .”)  
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effect.278 They therefore argue that “when we identify single events as 
causes it appears that we choose one element from such a set, 
although each of the members of the set is equally required for the 
production of the effect.”279 A classic example is the case of 
determining the cause of a fire when a lighted match was dropped 
into a wastepaper basket. It is intuitive to say that the lighted match 
caused the fire, even though the presence of oxygen was also a 
necessary background condition.280  
The natural question presented is, therefore, what separates an 
element that is considered to be a “cause” from other factors 
necessary to produce the effect?281 One explanation is that a cause “is 
an interference in the natural course of events which makes a 
difference in the way these develop.”282 This definition is particularly 
useful for “simple cases” where an individual produces “some desired 
effect by manipulation of an object in [the] environment.”283 
One important feature of this approach is that it takes into 
account the normal background conditions in which a cause operates. 
It rests on a “presumption, normally fulfilled but rebuttable, that 
when we deliberately intervene in nature to bring about effects which 
in fact supervene, no other explanation of their occurrence is to be 
found.”284 Normal conditions are those that are present both in the 
ordinary functioning of the item or process in question, and in the 
case of an accident or mishap.285 They are therefore ruled out as a 
 
278. Id. at 17. 
279. Id. 
280. The Restatement (Third) of Torts largely adopts Hart and Honoré’s 
view with the exception that it does not distinguish between causes and 
conditions, but rather considers all conditions necessary for the 
occurrence of an event to be “causes.” Causes are then divided into 
“relevant causes” (those brought about by tortious conduct) and 
“background causes.” Tortious conduct must only be a cause of harm in 
order for liability to follow. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & 
EMOT. HARM § 26 cmt. (d) & Reporter’s Note (2010). Because the 
language used in the restatement may prove confusing in a non-legal 
context where there is often no tortious conduct, this article relies upon 
the more traditional language which distinguishes causes of an event 
from conditions for its occurrence. 
281. HART & HONORÉ, supra note 273, at 17. 
282. Id. at 29. This should be distinguished from the “substantial factor” 
test, which has been soundly rejected by RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 26 cmt. (j) (2010), and regarded as a 
further exploration of the concept of factual causation. 
283. HART & HONORÉ, supra note 273, at 29. 
284. Id. at 32. 
285. Id. at 34. 
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cause of any particular accident.286 “[N]ormal conditions (and hence in 
causal inquiries mere conditions) are those conditions which are 
present as part of the usual state or mode of operation of the thing 
under inquiry.”287 For example, when considering what caused a train 
accident, a bent rail is likely to be considered a cause, because it, 
rather than the speed and weight of the train operating as usual, 
made the difference between the train’s normal functioning and its 
derailment.288 This is the case even though the crash would not have 
occurred as it did if the train were not traveling at that speed or if it 
did not have the same weight.289  
Causal definition in this manner is particularly useful in the 
research context. To begin with, it supports the proposition that 
participation in research must be a cause in fact, or sine qua non, of a 
research related injury.290 It also tells us, however, that the inquiry 
must not stop there. To say that an injury would not have occurred 
but for the subject’s participation in research only identifies research 
as one of the background conditions that was necessary for the injury 
to occur. It does not pluck it out from among those conditions and 
identify it as a cause of the injury.291 This definition, without more, 
would not rule out compensation for injuries that, for example, occur 
due to traffic accidents on the way to the research clinic.292 In order to 
identify research participation as the cause of the injury, it is 
therefore necessary to determine what research activity has caused a 
deviation from the normal conditions that otherwise would have 
prevailed. 
This definition excludes the natural progression of a 
patient/participant’s illness as a cause of a research related injury if 
the illness would have progressed regardless of the individual’s 
participation in research. For example, imagine the case of an 
individual with advanced cancer, for whom all standard treatments 
have failed. This individual’s prognosis is poor, and death is likely to 
occur. Because death is the expected outcome for this participant, due 
to the natural progression of his or her disease, failure of a clinical 
 
286. Id. 
287. Id. at 35. 
288. Id. at 34. 
289. See id. 
290. See id. at 17. 
291. See, e.g., id. at 17, 34.  
292. Such injuries should be ruled out because, in those cases, there is 
another primary duty bearer, namely the motorist who injured the 
research subject, and also because they are not the types of injury that 
a compensation scheme is designed to protect against. See supra note 
269 on scope of liability. 
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trial intervention to avert that outcome is not a change in the normal 
operating conditions that will make a difference in the way those 
conditions develop. The search for a cause, as distinguished from a 
mere condition for the occurrence of an injury, should also guide the 
search for an explanation for any given injury. 
What counts as a normal condition for a particular occurrence 
may often be the product of human habit, custom, or convention.293 
This observation is of particular importance in the medical context 
because, with the knowledge that some conditions are harmful in the 
absence of human intervention and are commonly ameliorated with 
appropriate medical attention, it becomes the normal state of affairs 
to intervene, and the lack of intervention is therefore a deviation from 
the normal course of events.294 An example is helpful to understand 
how this principle operates in practice. Imagine that Ms. Smith has 
been diagnosed with pneumonia. In the ordinary course of events, it is 
known that prompt treatment with antibiotics is generally curative, 
and that in the absence of treatment, the pneumonia may become 
significantly worse.295 In this case, it could be said that the failure to 
treat Ms. Smith’s pneumonia was the cause of the advancement of her 
disease and her ultimate death. 
b. Causes and Human Action 
In identifying a cause of an event, special importance is given to 
voluntary human action. It “is often regarded both as a limit [on how 
far back we trace the chain of causation] and also as still a cause even 
though other later abnormal occurrences have provisionally been 
recognized as causes.”296 An ordinary causal inquiry, in which we are 
seeking to explain an occurrence, will not ordinarily be traced 
“through a deliberate act.”297 Abnormal consequences that follow a 
deliberate act are also likely to be regarded as mere means by which 
the act reaches its natural end.298 A deliberate human act is therefore 
a natural boundary for the causal inquiry. We do not trace the path 
of a later event back through it, and we pass through intermediate 
causes of other kinds on our way to it.299  
 
293. HART & HONORÉ, supra note 273, at 37. 
294. See, e.g., id. 
295. How is Pneumonia Treated?, NAT’L HEART, LUNG & BLOOD INST., 
http://www.nhlbi.nih.gov/health/health-
topics/topics/pnu/treatment.html (last visited Aug. 11, 2014). 
296. HART & HONORÉ, supra note 273, at 42. 
297. Id. at 43. 
298. See id.  
299. See id. at 44. 
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Our inquiry thus far should lead to the conclusion that a cause 
will differ from other necessary circumstances for the occurrence of a 
later event because it will be an abnormal condition, and it will often 
be brought about by a deliberate human action. A cause, once 
identified, should also be unproblematically connected to the 
consequences or effect it produced.300 This means that it should fit 
within the broad generalizations about what types of action produce 
what types of effects, and it should also fit within the framework of 
past cases.301 
The causal inquiry we seek to enter into in the research related 
injury context has both explanatory and attributive aspects.302 In 
asking what caused a particular research injury, an explanation is 
sought for the origin of the injury, and the question is asked as to 
who, if anyone, should be held responsible for the damage. In linking 
a consequence to its cause, we encounter a number of intervening 
factors and conditions, some of “which are not only subsequent to, 
but independent of the initiating action or event.”303 Imagine, for 
example, a participant who is sickened by the administration of the 
trial medication and is likely to die, but before the drug can have that 
effect, an old enemy, not knowing this is the case, stabs him to death. 
In assessing these intermediate factors, the mere background 
“conditions in or on which the cause operates” must be distinguished 
from those factors that may break the chain of causation.304 
Conditions are often separated from intervening causes by an analogy 
with the case of simple actions. In the usual case, a voluntary human 
action, which follows the initial “cause,” will break the proverbial 
causal chain. It is an intervention through which the cause is not 
traced.305 In the example above, the administration of the trial drug 
could be said to have made the participant ill, but it was not the 
cause of his death; rather, the causal link was broken by the 
deliberate action of a third party. This case is contrasted with 
“actions which in any of a variety of different ways are less than fully 
voluntary,” and which “are assimilated to the means by which or the 
circumstances in which the earlier action brings about the 
 
300. See id. at 46. 
301. Id. at 46-47. 
302. See id. at 73. 
303. Id. at 72.  
304. Id. 
305. Id. at 75 (explaining that this rule does not hold “where an opportunity 
commonly exploited for harmful action is negligently provided, or one 
person intentionally provides another with the means, the opportunity, 
or a certain type of reason for wrongdoing.”). 
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consequences.”306 Similarly, the causal chain is broken by the 
occurrence of coincidences, so long as the coincidence was not 
contrived or intended by the initial actor (i.e. if our unfortunate 
research subject was killed by a falling tree branch rather than 
another person).307 A cause will not be broken, however, by an 
abnormal state of the thing acted upon at the time that the act 
occurs. For example, if an individual (A) hits another (B), and it 
turns out that B had the proverbial “eggshell skull” and is killed by 
the blow, it would be said that A has caused B’s death even though B 
was unusually susceptible to harm and an ordinary person without 
that condition would not have been killed by a blow of the type that 
A delivered. Such a preexisting condition is merely “part of the 
circumstances in which the cause ‘operates.’”308 
In seeking to explain the cause of an injury that occurs during 
research, it is necessary to trace the chain of events leading up to an 
injury back to the point where an abnormal occurrence disturbed 
what would otherwise have been the normal order of things. 
Voluntary human action is a particularly salient disturbance because 
we generally operate on the premise that voluntary conduct has the 
potential to alter the world in which it operates. Therefore, in tracing 
back the causal chain leading to an injury in the research setting, 
special attention should be paid to whether a human intervention 
(such as the taking of blood, administration of a novel drug, or 
performance of a medical procedure) is included in the chain of 
causation. Application of Hart and Honoré’s analysis to the research 
context also counsels that biological differences in research subjects 
that may make them more or less susceptible to injury should not be 
weighed in determining whether research participation truly was the 
cause of the injury.309 The relationship between human action and 
causation does not counsel that all injuries following a research 
intervention are research related, but rather provides a useful 
guidepost for the causal question. 
A second and related question will be whether this human 
intervention was performed for the purpose of furthering the aims of 
 
306. Id.  
307. Id. at 78 (“We speak of a coincidence whenever the conjunction of two 
or more events in certain spatial or temporal relations (1) is very 
unlikely by ordinary standards and (2) is for some reason significant or 
important, provided (3) that they occur without human contrivance and 
(4) are independent of each other.”). 
308. Id. at 80. 
309. Of course, such considerations may need to be taken into account when 
determining whether certain potential participants should be excluded 
from research participation on the grounds of increased risk. See Dave 
Wendler, When Should “Riskier” Subjects Be Excluded From Research 
Participation?, 8 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 307, 307 (1998). 
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research, or whether it was part of ordinary or concomitant medical 
care. This is addressed below in the context of the relationship 
between causation and the standard of care. It is not a causal inquiry 
in and of itself, but rather a baseline determination of whether the 
event that caused the injury was itself research related. By following 
this two-step process, the inquirer first determines whether an 
intervention was a cause of an injury, and next determines whether 
that intervention was research related. 
c. Causes and Principles of Policy310 
What is described as a cause “may have features which vary from 
context to context,” there may be “different types of causal inquiry,” 
and “there may not be a single concept of causation but rather a 
cluster of related concepts.”311 Hart and Honoré have noted that there 
is an insistence in the modern critiques of the concept of causation 
that, “where the existence or the extent of liability for the violation of 
statute is in issue, a range of problems, which appear insoluble if 
considered in causal terms are relatively easily solved if viewed as 
questions concerning the scope or purpose of the statute, or the 
nature of the interests it was designed to protect.”312 While Hart and 
Honoré do not endorse the modern critique in its entirety, they do 
acknowledge that the concept of policy limitations on causation has a 
proper place in an analysis of causation in the law. Limitations on 
causation may therefore be created not only by legal principles of 
causation, but also by “special principles of policy.”313  
Such principles of policy are often introduced by way of analysis 
of foreseeability and risk. These concepts are balanced somewhat 
precariously on the border between truly causal questions and 
limitations on causation that are set as a matter of policy.314 The 
foreseeability and risk doctrines aim to address the proper scope of 
the causal inquiry and provide a formula for determining when 
attribution of responsibility for an event is appropriate. Foreseeability 
 
310. Hart and Honoré preceded the Restatement (Third) of Torts in 
identifying proximate cause not as a type of cause, but rather as a 
principle of policy more appropriately addressed (as it is in the latest 
edition of the restatement) as dealing with the “scope of liability.” See 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 26 cmt. (a) & 
Reporter’s Note (2010). 
311. HART & HONORÉ, supra note 273, at 19. 
312. Id. at 102. 
313. Id. at 93. 
314. Id. (“A legal system may mark more or less strongly and in various 
ways the distinction between the limits on liability imposed by 
principles of causation and those imposed by special principles of 
policy[.]”). 
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may either limit or expand the scope of the causal inquiry.315 In its 
limiting form, it holds that “only foreseeable harm is recoverable,” 
which serves to remove responsibility from the defendant for effects of 
his conduct that would not be predictable to the ordinary man at the 
time of its undertaking.316 In its expansive form, foreseeability requires 
that all foreseeable harm, for which the defendant’s act was a 
necessary condition, be recoverable.317 In practice, the concept of 
foreseeability has not been uniformly applied, and it often fails to 
adequately address questions where both an explanation and an 
attribution of cause are sought.318 Risk theory, by contrast, asks who 
should bear the risk of a particular injury.319 That determination is 
based in policy, and the answer may vary depending on the 
justification put forth. Risk theory, like foreseeability, both extends 
and restricts the attribution of consequences; however, unlike 
foreseeability, risk theory does so by restricting liability to “those 
types of harm the chance or risk of which formed the reason or a 
reason for the imposition of liability.”320  
Although foreseeability seems like a logical fit for the research 
context with its focus on prospective risk mitigation, risk theory is 
particularly applicable to the problem of compensation for research 
related injuries. The justification for requiring compensation in these 
cases is often not rooted in negligence, but in a considered 
determination of who, all things considered, ought to bear the risk of 
injury.321 It flows from that determination that recovery should be 
limited to those types of harm that are justified by that allocation 
determination. Within that limitation, however, a risk theory analysis 
would be incomplete without reference to causal concepts.322 Risk 
theory is most useful here to set an outer limit on the causal inquiry 
so that compensation is provided when the injury is caused by 
research and when it is within the risks that led to the imposition of a 
compensation obligation in the first place.323 Such a limitation serves 
 
315. See id. at 258. The foreseeability inquiry can also be framed as one of 
proximate cause or scope of liability. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM ch. 6, spec. note (2010). 
316. See id. at 263, 275. 
317. Id. at 275. 
318. See id. at 284. 
319. Id. at 285. 
320. Id. at 86. 
321. See supra Part II. 
322. HART & HONORÉ, supra note 273, at 285. 
323. This can also be thought about in terms of defining the scope of 
liability. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM 
ch. 6 spec. note (2010). 
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the purpose of ensuring that the law as implemented is in line with 
the justifications for imposing a compensation requirement in the 
absence of culpable conduct. 
Finally, it should be noted that causation, as a concept in the 
law, cannot be entirely divorced from notions associated with moral 
responsibility. In general, “to say that someone is responsible for some 
harm means that in accordance with legal rules or moral principles it 
is at least permissible, if not mandatory, to blame or punish or exact 
compensation from him.”324 It is not true however that such a 
correlation is present in all cases. The law is well within its purview 
to draw a line around illegal conduct that is different from the 
common morality.325 It is therefore the case that moral blame is 
neither necessary nor sufficient for legal responsibility.326 In some 
cases, however, it is desirable to draft a law that best matches the 
ethical obligations of the regulated parties so that the values 
embodied in the law mirror those of the common morality.327 This is 
particularly the case in the regulation of biomedical research, which 
has its own field dedicated to the analysis of what constitutes the 
proper ethical conduct of research activities.328 In part due to the 
evolving understanding of the ethics of clinical research, the law has 
attempted to mirror the ethical obligations of the parties involved in 
order to promote a balance between protecting the interests of 
research participants and allowing for the advancement of medical 
science.329  
Policy considerations can and should guide the development of 
the scope of responsibility within which causal concepts operate in 
compensation systems for research related injury.330 Experience 
demonstrates that when cause is defined too broadly or not limited in 
scope, it can have a damaging effect on the research enterprise.331 This 
 
324. HART & HONORÉ, supra note 273, at 65. 
325. See, e.g., Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On 
Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625, 650-51 
(1984). 
326. HART & HONORÉ, supra note 273, at 67. 
327. See, e.g., id. at 66. See also Dan-Cohen, supra note 325, at 650-51. 
328. See Emanuel et al., supra note 156, at 2701. 
329. See, e.g., London, supra note 246. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, On 
the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021 (1996) 
(discussing the law’s tendency to not only reflect but also fortify social 
norms). 
330. In the past, this idea has been associated with the concept of proximate 
cause. It is akin to scope of liability as laid out in the Restatement 
(Third) of Torts, supra note 310. 
331. See Kripa Mahalingam, Critical Condition, OUTLOOK BUSINESS (Mar. 1, 
2014), http://business.outlookindia.com/article_v3.aspx?artid=289527. 
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was the case when India first introduced its new requirements for 
compensation of research related injuries, and it resulted in numerous 
companies either pausing or withdrawing from research in India.332 
The scope of responsibility should not be defined so broadly that it 
prevents the biomedical research enterprise from performing its core 
function, namely the development of novel therapies and devices for 
treatment of medical conditions. There is a delicate balance to be 
struck between the moral claims of injured research subjects and the 
social benefit produced by the continuation of the research enterprise. 
It is therefore advisable to use policy as a tool to limit the reach of 
causation when necessary to protect countervailing social concerns. 
2. A Theory of Causation for Research Related Injuries: The Positive 
Case  
In light of the above discussion, it is possible to put forth a 
positive account of what it means for an injury to have been caused 
by research. To begin with the most basic elements of causation, it 
must first be the case that the subject’s participation in research is a 
cause in fact of the injury—in other words, that the injury would not 
have occurred but for the decision to enter into research. Next, a 
research intervention must create a condition that differs from the 
normal course of events, and that condition must lead (sometimes 
through a series of events) to the injury. This definition includes 
injuries due to administration of the study intervention and injuries 
incurred due to performance of medical procedures that are necessary 
for research, but are not clinically indicated.333  
Injuries that are due to the natural progression of the 
participant’s illness and those injuries that result from the 
participant’s deviation from the research protocol are excluded 
 
332. Id. 
333. It should be noted that this proposed definition tracks closely with that 
provided by HEW SECY’S TASK FORCE ON THE COMP. OF INJURED 
RESEARCH SUBJECTS, U.S. DEP’T. OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, 
REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE II-2 (1977) [hereinafter SECY’S TASK 
FORCE], which stated that human subjects who suffer physical, 
psychological, or social injury in the course of research conducted or 
supported by the PHS should be compensated if (1) the injury is 
proximately caused by such research, and (2) the injury on balance 
exceeds that reasonably associated with such illness from which the 
subject may be suffering, as well as with treatment usually associated 
with such illness at the time the subject began participation in the 
research. The definition proposed here is different because it relies on a 
more robust theory of causation that is tailored to the research context 
and limits the types of injuries considered (see infra). These changes are 
supported by the experience of the international community in 
confronting this topic (see supra Part I.A) and by the fact that the 
locus of responsibility under this proposal is not being placed upon the 
federal government, as the 1977 task force recommended.  
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because in those cases the research intervention cannot be identified 
as a cause among the many conditions that were necessary for the 
injury to occur.334 When a research intervention is one of multiple 
causes of an injury, reduction in the amount of compensation may be 
appropriate.335 The reduction in compensation should be proportionate 
to the contribution of the various causes (if that could be determined) 
and it should also reflect the fact that not all of the harm can be said 
to have been caused by research related interventions. Risk theory 
may provide some guidance in borderline cases because it allows 
consideration of which party ought to bear the risk of injury to come 
into the decision-making process when deciding whether compensation 
is owed. In practice, this should mean that in borderline cases, the 
evidence should be interpreted leniently in favor of the injured 
subject.336 
3. Intersection of Causation with the Standard of Care: The Negative 
Case 
A second question that arises when attempting to determine 
whether an individual has suffered a research related injury is in what 
cases an omission can be said to be the cause of a research related 
injury. An omission in this case is best defined as the failure to 
provide medically indicated treatment for the participant-subject’s 
underlying disease or condition. A clinical trial operates against the 
background of the de facto standard of care in the host nation.337 The 
de facto standard of care is one in “which the standards of medical 
practice for a community are set by the actual medical practices of 
that community.”338 In general, when an individual enters a clinical 
 
334. This is under the theory of contributory negligence. True, the research 
participation creates an opportunity for the injury to occur, but it is the 
participant’s negligent conduct that causes the injury, whereas if the 
participant had followed the protocol, the injury would not have 
occurred. There may be an exception to this principle available if the 
participant can demonstrate that the burden of compliance was 
unreasonably high, but this is not likely because the participant should 
have been able to judge, when entering the research, whether 
compliance would be feasible. All responsibility in these cases cannot 
and should not be placed on individuals other than the patient. 
335. See HART & HONORÉ, supra note 273, at 180. 
336. Henry et al., supra note 115, at 10-11. This is similar to giving the 
participants the benefit of the doubt when determining whether an 
injury was research related. 
337. See Alex John London, The Ambiguity and the Exigency: Clarifying 
“Standard of Care” Arguments in International Research, 25 J. MED. & 
Phil. 379, 382 (2000) (defining the de facto standard of care as the local 
standard of actual medical practice). 
338. Id. London also illustrates that this can be distinguished from the “de 
jure” standard of care which is set not by actual practice, but “by the 
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trial, he or she faces a choice between trial participation and seeking 
standard of care treatment in the community.339 In practice, this 
choice may be constrained on an individual basis by a number of 
factors including the availability of medical care in the community, 
the individual’s financial resources, and the success that the 
individual has had with other treatments, if such treatments have 
previously been tried. It is intuitive to think that an individual, on 
account of his or her greater financial resources, may have access to a 
better standard of care than is generally available locally, but for the 
majority of research participants this will not be the case. 
If the individual chooses to participate in research, he or she 
might receive the study intervention or be placed in the control arm. 
The control arm is the standard against which the new intervention is 
tested.340 There is currently a robust debate as to what standard of 
care must be provided in the control arm of international clinical 
trials, and whether it is ever acceptable to provide less than the best 
available standard of care.341 It has been convincingly argued, 
however, that it may be appropriate for a study to test an 
intervention against less than the best available standard of care 
where four criteria are met: (1) scientific necessity, (2) host 
community relevance, (3) sufficient host community benefit, and (4) 
subject and host community non-maleficence.342 Under these criteria, 
there is substantial room for difference between research projects as to 
what may ethically be used as a control.343 The question then 
 
judgment of experts in the medical community as to which diagnostic 
and therapeutic practices have proven most effective against the illness 
in question.” Id. at 384. 
339. See, e.g., David Wendler et al., The Standard of Care Debate: Can 
Research in Developing Countries Be Both Ethical and Responsive to 
Those Countries’ Health Needs?, 94 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 923, 924 
(2004) (describing short course AZT trials and the decision faced by 
participants of receiving the trial intervention or a placebo, which was 
consistent with the care that would have been available in the 
community outside of the research setting).  
340. See id. 
341. See London, supra note 337. See also Wendler et al., supra note 339. 
342. Wendler et al., supra note 339, at 927. The authors define those terms 
as follows: “(1) scientific necessity: investigators must use less than the 
worldwide best methods to answer the scientific question posed by the 
trial; (2) relevance for the host community: answering the scientific 
question posed by the trial will help address an important health need of 
the host community; (3) sufficient host community benefit: the trial will 
produce a fair level of benefit for the host community; and (4) subject 
and host community nonmaleficence: subjects and the host community 
will not be made prospectively worse off than they would be in the 
absence of the trial.” 
343. See id. 
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presented by the standard of care debate is under what circumstances 
injuries resulting from randomization to the control arm of a clinical 
trial can be counted as an injury that is caused by research 
participation. 
As was noted above, something is the cause of a later event where 
it is both a necessary condition for the occurrence of that event and it 
reflects a change or aberration from the conditions that would have 
been present under normal circumstances.344 Conduct that causes 
injury may be described either as an act or an omission.345 As Hart 
and Honoré have noted, “if there is a legal duty to do an act, and the 
subject has not done it, the legally relevant description will be in 
terms of an omission to perform the act in question.”346 The same 
framework can be applied to the ethical obligations held by 
researchers, sponsors, and institutions. In general, researchers have a 
positive ethical obligation to provide the ethically justified standard of 
care treatment to their research subjects.347 As noted above, this 
principle is softened when there are good reasons to believe that it is 
necessary to use either a placebo control or the local standard of care 
in order to produce a valid and valuable scientific result.348 When the 
conditions for a permissible deviation from the best available standard 
of care are met, failure to provide the best available standard of care 
should not constitute a research related injury. 
Under this framework, the local de facto standard of care provides 
a sharp lower boundary for the inclusion of failure to provide 
standard care in the definition of a compensable research related 
injury. Even if the control arm may permissibly use something less 
than the local standard of care (e.g., a placebo), research participants 
who choose to forego the (higher) local de facto standard of care in 
order to participate in the clinical trial and suffer an injury because of 
that decision may causally attribute that injury to the failure to 
provide appropriate medical care that would otherwise have been 
available.349 Under this framework, the failure to provide the de facto  
344. See supra Part III.A. 
345. HART & HONORÉ, supra note 273, at 138. 
346. Id. at 139.  
347. See, e.g., Wendler et al., supra note 339, at 927. See also BEAUCHAMP & 
CHILDRESS, supra note 151, at 153. 
348. See Wendler et al., supra note 339, at 927. 
349. It is an open question at this point whether the de facto local standard 
of care or the de jure local standard of care is the most appropriate 
baseline measure. The important point to be made, however, remains 
the same: failure to provide care where there is an obligation to provide 
that care may be counted as a cause of an injury that flows from the 
lack of care and would not have occurred in its absence. See, e.g., 
London, supra note 337. See also BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 
151, at 153. 
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local standard of care is the cause (by omission) of any ill effects that 
would not have occurred but for the decision of the participant to 
forego standard of care treatment.350  
A duty to pay compensation for injuries due to failure to provide 
the ethically appropriate (as opposed to the local de facto) standard 
of care is supported by the principle of nonmaleficence and its 
requirement of risk minimization.351 Nonmaleficence requires research 
sponsors, institutions, and researchers to “strive to minimize, 
consistent with the scientific aims of their research, the risks and 
burdens their experimental procedures impose.”352 Part of the 
obligation of risk minimization is the requirement that the study 
intervention be tested against the best available standard of care 
unless there are ethically and scientifically valid reasons for downward 
deviation.353 An injury caused by the failure to provide the 
appropriate standard of care is one caused by an omission in the 
presence of a duty.354 It should therefore be considered a compensable 
research related injury. 
As Hart and Honoré have noted, “[a] legal system may mark more 
or less strongly and in various ways the distinction between the limits 
on liability imposed by principles of causation and those imposed by 
special principles of policy.”355 As a matter of public policy, many 
countries may have valid reasons to limit compensable injuries due to 
failure to provide the standard of care to those where the local de 
facto standard of care has not been provided. This policy is supported 
by the principle of compensatory and distributive justice because it 
rewards the choice to participate in research and the decision, implicit 
in that choice, to forego standard of care treatment in the 
community.356 It is this choice that produces societal benefit in the 
form of medical progress.357 A decision to participate in research is 
valuable because results, whether or not they support the use of the 
studied intervention, provide medical knowledge that is useful for 
future experimentation.358 It is ethically desirable, then, to distribute 
the burdens of research related injury as broadly as the benefits. In 
 
350. See HART & HONORÉ, supra note 273, at 138 (defining a cause by 
omission). 
351. See supra Part II. 
352. See Joffe & Miller, supra note 21, at 36. 
353. See Wendler et al., supra note 339, at 927. 
354. HART & HONORÉ, supra note 273, at 139. 
355. Id. 
356. See supra Part II. 
357. Id. 
358. Henry et al., supra note 115, at 7. 
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this way, what might be an unbearable burden for one person is a 
relatively light burden when spread more broadly. 
The precise nexus of causation with the standard of care, 
therefore, depends on a number of factors: (1) the care that would be 
available to participants outside of the research setting; (2) the 
standard of care that researchers are ethically obligated to provide; 
(3) the justification supporting the compensation requirement; and (4) 
in light of the preceding three factors, was the injury caused by the 
failure to provide a particular standard of care when that same 
standard of care was owed? The standard of care that is owed will 
vary depending on the precise conditions in which a clinical trial is 
situated, but it is important to make clear that the procedure for 
distinguishing compensable research related injuries from injuries 
incident to provision of medical care can be applied in a uniform 
manner.359 
B. Type 
The second element of a well-regulated injury is that of type. 
Type refers to the distinction between medical360 injuries and other 
types of intangible harm. Intangible harms have been recognized as an 
important subset of risks to which research participants may be 
exposed.361 The Declaration of Helsinki requires that researchers 
recognize and guard against risks to the “life, health, dignity, 
integrity, right to self-determination, privacy, and confidentiality of 
personal information of research subjects.”362 The Belmont Report’s 
requirement that ethical research have “respect for persons” may also 
support recognition of some types of intangible harm.363 Others have 
argued that such intangible harms might include: 
[N]ot only emotional distress, but also lost opportunity costs, 
destruction of trust and confidence in the research process, 
clinical trial abandonment, affront to dignitary interests, breach 
of confidentiality, invasion of privacy, loss of meaningful choice 
about use of one’s body as an experimental object, participation 
 
359. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 26, cmt. n 
(2010). Lost Opportunity or Lost Chance as Harm may provide some 
valuable insight into the evaluation of damages where it is difficult to 
determine what the research participant’s precise medical course would 
have been if the research participant had either opted not to enroll in 
research or been randomized differently. 
360. Documented mental health injuries (such as the onset of post-traumatic 
stress disorder) requiring further medical treatment should be considered 
“tangible” injuries for purposes of compensation.  
361. See Saver, supra note 173, at 941, 
362. WMA DECLARATION OF HELSINKI, supra note 35. 
363. Saver, supra note 173, at 952. 
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in a study that fails to disseminate trial data in order to 
advance medical knowledge, and frustrated access to perceived 
cutting-edge therapy.364 
The question presented is, therefore, whether both tangible and 
intangible injuries should be compensated in light of the ethical 
principles that justify the creation of a compensation requirement. 
The principle of nonmaleficence is implemented through the 
requirement for risk minimization. Risk minimization is not without 
its limits, and may be constrained by considerations of cost, 
participant autonomy, and scientific integrity.365 In particular, 
researchers’ duty to minimize risks is constrained by the ability to 
accurately predict the harms that might arise as a consequence of a 
particular clinical trial. This should include the elimination of 
foreseeable intangible harms such as dignitary harms flowing from the 
failure to obtain fully informed consent. A duty to minimize dignitary 
and intangible harms does not necessarily imply that those harms 
should also be compensable. 
Intangible harms that do not flow from some form of wrongful 
conduct are likely to be unforeseeable and difficult to prove within 
any compensation framework. For example, Brazil’s regulations on 
research related injury allow for compensation in cases of spiritual 
injury.366 What will be found to be injurious to the spirit is, by its 
nature, a deeply subjective inquiry that is not easily predictable 
without an in-depth screening of potential research participants’ 
spiritual beliefs. Nonmaleficence therefore provides weak justification 
for the provision of compensation as a remedy for these types of 
harms. In addition to the weak normative justification, it is unclear 
that compensation would provide an appropriate remedy for the type 
of harm suffered in these cases because there are often no economic 
damages. In the absence of wrongdoing, punitive damages are 
inappropriate. 
Compensatory and distributive justice, by contrast, seek to 
reward the decision of individuals to participate in research rather 
than seek standard of care treatment. It may therefore be the case 
that distributive and compensatory justice require compensation for 
all injuries caused by the decision to participate in research without 
regard to type.367 This may be limited in application, however,  
364. Id. at 946. 
365. See Joffe & Miller, supra note 21, at 36. 
366. See NAT’L HEALTH COUNCIL, ON RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN SUBJECTS, 
Res. No. 196/96 (1987). 
367. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, supra note 27, at 
II-2 (stating that “[h]uman subjects who suffer physical ~ psychological~ 
or social injury in the course of research conducted or supported by the 
PHS should be compensated . . . .”). 
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because of practical problems of proof with respect to intangible 
harms in the absence of clear evidence of wrongdoing.368 In particular, 
claims of intangible harm are not subject to objective proof, and they 
are not of the sort where the monetary cost of compensation could be 
easily predicted.369 
Compensation systems in other countries and the tort framework 
in the United States have dealt with this type of uncertainty by 
requiring that an intangible harm be paired with a physical injury or 
proximity to a physical injury in order to be compensable.370 It may 
be reasonable to define a certain subset of intangible harms that are 
particularly likely to flow from research participation as opposed to 
clinical care and to limit compensation to those defined circumstances 
in order to mitigate problems with burdens of proof.371 
Finally, reparative justice aims to compensate an individual for all 
harms flowing from the wrongful conduct of another. Many of the 
most salient intangible harms are those that stem from some form of 
wrongful conduct such as the failure to ensure informed consent or 
abuse of the power imbalance inherent in the investigator-subject 
relationship.372 Reparative justice seeks to put the harmed individual 
in as good a position as if the wrong in question had never happened. 
The principle of reparative justice therefore counsels that all types of 
injury should be compensable, subject to some of the same possible 
limitations on proof that arise in the context of distributive and 
compensatory justice. In cases like these, an alternative remedy may 
be appropriate such as nominal compensation and recognition of the 
harm done.373 
In light of the foregoing discussion, the principles requiring 
compensation may support inclusion of intangible harms, but 
 
368. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 787 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (holding 
that a physician seeking informed consent “cannot know with complete 
exactitude what the patient would consider important to his decision, 
but on the basis of his medical training and experience he can sense how 
the average, reasonable patient expectably would react.”). 
369. Indeed, many no-fault compensation systems in the United States have 
awarded a flat sum for intangible harms, such as pain and suffering, 
because the difficulty of trying to evaluate individual circumstances 
would have threatened to overwhelm the claims process. See, e.g., 
KENNETH R. FEINBERG, WHO GETS WHAT: FAIR COMPENSATION AFTER 
TRAGEDY AND FINANCIAL UPHEAVAL 104 (2012). 
370. See, e.g., New Zealand Accident Compensation Act 2001, SR 49/2001. 
See also Saver, supra note 173, at 948. 
371. See, e.g., FEINBERG, supra note 369, at 104 (describing Hokie Memorial 
Fund Plan, which based compensation for pain and suffering on length 
of hospital stay, rather than an individual analysis). 
372. See Saver, supra note 361, at 990.  
373. See id. at 999. 
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practical and evidentiary concerns may justify limiting the universe of 
compensable injuries to only those where there is medical harm. Often 
care for the medical harms that may result from a research injury 
might mitigate intangible harms such as feelings of abandonment 
which could otherwise have flowed from the same event.374 In such 
cases, treatment and compensation for physical injuries is sufficient to 
ameliorate any harm done. Where there is an intangible harm that is 
attendant to a physical harm, additional compensation may be 
appropriate. And where there is an intangible harm stemming from 
wrongful conduct, some form of redress is appropriate, although 
compensation may not be the best remedy for the harm done.375 
C. Degree 
Degree (or “magnitude”) of harm refers to the severity of the 
injury suffered. When analyzing risks, researchers, and IRBs are well 
advised to consider what procedures or interventions would be used in 
standard of care treatment, and to exclude those from the calculation 
of the risk that the research poses.376 Similarly, when determining 
what degree of harm should be considered compensable, the level of 
risk inherent in the research project and the level of discomfort 
associated with standard care should be considered.377 In agreeing to 
enroll in a trial, research participants consent to some degree of 
discomfort that is inevitable even if everything goes as planned.378 
Degree can be used to separate those injuries where treatment is 
sufficient to fulfill the duty owed to the research subject from those 
injuries where financial compensation is also warranted. 
Nonmaleficence does not require that research be risk-free; rather, 
it merely requires that risks be minimized consistent with the 
scientific aims of the study.379 Requiring monetary compensation for 
all injuries, regardless of degree, would overstate the obligation owed 
 
374. See id. at 1002. 
375. Richard Saver has suggested a number of remedies, including a judicial 
forum akin to that provided for civil rights litigation. See id. at 992. 
376. Id. at 955-956. 
377. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC., AND WELFARE, supra note 27, at II-2 
(stating that research injuries should be compensated if “[t]he injury on 
balance exceeds that reasonably associated with such illness from which 
the subject may be suffering, as well as with treatment usually 
associated with such illness at the time the subject began participation 
in the research.”). 
378. For example, participants in a malaria vaccine challenge study should 
know (if consent was properly informed) that they might get malaria. 
See generally 45 C.F.R. § 46 (2009) (setting forth requirements for 
informed consent). 
379. Joffe & Miller, supra note 21, at 36. 
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on the part of the research enterprise.380 Other protections, such as 
IRB review and informed consent, ensure that participants are aware 
of the burdens of research participation, and participants may be 
compensated for those burdens in the form of payment for 
participation or provision of ancillary medical care.381  
Many of the small harms that may be associated with ordinary 
clinical care, such as bruising at the site of a blood draw or a mild 
infection, may not warrant compensation because the injury itself 
either will resolve spontaneously or will be cured with treatment 
alone. For such small harms, treatment sufficiently minimizes the risk 
of future harm and cures the harm already done to the subject 
without the need for compensation. There is no need for financial 
compensation in these cases because it is unnecessary to make the 
subject whole.382 
Distributive justice, which is based on the sharing of the benefits 
and burdens of research, also requires treatment (but not 
compensation) in these cases where the injury is slight, because the 
burden is so light that the subject alone is expected to bear it without 
the need to distribute the burden any further. An analysis under 
reparative justice reaches the same conclusion because, where the 
harm is small, treatment is all that is necessary to repair the harm 
done. These three justifications for compensation reach the same 
result in the case of small harms because the subject has not suffered 
an injury that compensation is necessary to cure—proper medical care 
is sufficient. Of course, if the required medical treatment is billed to 
the participant, compensation may be owed to cover the cost of care. 
For injuries that persist,383 are severe, disabling, or cause death, 
compensation may be required because medical treatment alone does 
not cure the injury caused. This is the case where the injury has some 
enduring effect that, as a consequence leads to ongoing medical or 
economic harm, such as the cost of future medical care, diminished 
earning capacity, or lost wages.384 In those cases, nonmaleficence 
provides a justification for compensation because there is a substantial 
risk of further medical and financial harm to the subject if some form 
of compensation is not provided.385 These types of financial risks 
stemming from a serious injury are foreseeable and should be guarded 
 
380. See id.  
381. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 46 (2009); see also Grady, supra note 205, at 
1686. 
382. If the subject is compensated for his time and inconvenience, such small 
harms may also be accounted for in the amount of that payment. 
383. Meaning they require ongoing care or result in lasting impairment. 
384. Henry et al., supra note 115, at 4. 
385. See supra Part II. 
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against as part of the initial risk minimization requirements before a 
study may go forward.386 Distributive justice requires compensation in 
these cases because the cost of a severe injury, including medical care 
and lost wages, may be more than one individual can bear, but is 
relatively light when spread across all of the beneficiaries of 
biomedical research.387 Compensatory justice also requires 
compensation for this type of harm because it was incurred due to 
participation in a socially beneficial activity.388 Finally, reparative 
justice counsels in favor of compensation in cases of severe injury or 
death because treatment alone will not make the injured party 
whole.389 The loss in the case of a severe injury or death is greater 
than the physical loss and it must be treated accordingly.  
In light of the moral justifications for providing compensation for 
research related injuries, it may be permissible to limit compensation 
to those injuries where treatment alone is insufficient to repair the 
damage that has been done. It is reasonable for a compensation 
system, therefore, to limit recovery to cases of serious injury, 
disability, or death.  
D. Remedy 
Determination of an appropriate remedy provides the ability to 
tailor the compensation provided to the injury suffered.390 There are 
two broad categories of remedy that are applicable in the research 
injury context: treatment and compensation. As discussed briefly 
above, prompt treatment of research injuries is required by the 
principle of nonmaleficence because the failure to provide treatment 
creates a grave risk of future harm. Prompt treatment is relatively 
uncontroversial as a remedy and is provided by many institutions 
that do not otherwise provide compensation for research related 
injuries.391  
 
386. See supra Part II. See also ASS’N FOR THE BRIT. PHARM. INDUS. ET AL., 
INSURANCE AND COMPENSATION IN THE EVENT OF INJURY IN PHASE I 
CLINICAL TRIALS (June 2012) http://www.abpi.org.uk/our-
work/library/guidelines/Pages/clinical-trials-insurance.aspx. See also 
Medicines for Human Use (Clinical Trials) Regulations, 2004, S.I. 
2004/1031, art. 3, ¶ 15(5)(i) (U.K.) (providing for damages in the case 
of severe or disabling injuries). 
387. See supra Part II. 
388. See supra Part II. 
389. See supra Part II. 
390. See generally FEINBERG, supra note 369 (discussing the development of 
no-fault remedies in light of the reasons for the creation of various no-
fault compensation programs).  
391. See Resnik et al., supra note 37, at 6; see also LEWIN GROUP, 
CARE/COMPENSATION FOR INJURIES IN CLINICAL RESEARCH (Feb. 3, 
2005) (on file with the author). 
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Remedy is both the product of the preceding three elements 
(cause, type, and degree) and a policy judgment rooted in the 
justifications for the provision of compensation. In calculating what 
remedy is appropriate, it is necessary to ask whether there are any 
complications in the chain of causation present at the time of the 
injury that might provide a reason for downward deviation in the 
amount of compensation paid.392 Furthermore, the type and degree of 
injury will influence the amount of compensation that is required. 
Monetary remedies can be broken down broadly into two types: 
economic and non-economic. Economic remedies are those that 
compensate for actual economic harms, such as lost wages, costs of 
care, or loss of future earning potential. Non-economic remedies, 
however, compensate for intangible harms such as pain and suffering. 
The different bases for compensation lead to different conclusions 
with respect to economic and non-economic remedies. 
1. Economic Remedies 
Both the principle of nonmaleficence and the principles of 
distributive and compensatory justice support the provision of 
economic remedies. Financial harm flowing from medical harm is a 
foreseeable risk subject to mitigation and thus creates a duty in 
nonmaleficence.393 Financial harm that would not have occurred but 
for the subject’s decision to participate in biomedical research is 
subject to compensation under the theory of distributive or 
compensatory justice.394 The tort doctrine of strict accountability 
aligns with the bioethical principle of nonmaleficence and provides 
some support for the allocation of economic damages to injured 
research subjects. In its longer form, strict accountability is phrased 
as “strict accountability for harms within the scope of risks distinctive 
to an actor’s conduct or activity.”395 It reflects a judgment “that an 
actor, even though not at fault, should be liable for harms and risks 
distinctive to the actor’s conduct or activity.”396 This principle is 
particularly informative in the case of research related injuries, where 
there is a strong normative reason to reallocate the risk of injury from 
the party on which it falls (the injured research subject), to another 
appropriate actor. In this case, the principles of nonmaleficence and 
distributive and compensatory justice suggest that the cost of injury 
 
392. See HART & HONORÉ, supra note 273, at 180 (detailing how abnormal 
circumstances that are present at the time of the injury, rather than 
being incorporated in to the causal framework, are instead taken into 
account when determining what damages are owed). 
393. See supra Part II. 
394. See supra Part II. 
395. KEETON ET AL., supra note 260, at 609. 
396. Id. 
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should be reallocated to sponsors, institutions, researchers, and the 
public generally. This reallocation of costs is in part possible because 
the conduct of the duty bearers is socially valuable and will “survive 
in the marketplace even at the higher price that includes the cost of 
compensating for harms done.”397 It also limits compensation to 
injuries arising from conduct that is “within the risk” of the socially 
beneficial activity.398 This forces decision makers to ask whether the 
type of harm that occurred is of the sort that the policy allocating 
risk was designed to accommodate. For example, an injury due to an 
adverse reaction to an investigational drug is within the risks of 
biomedical research, while a road accident on the way to the clinic 
arguably may be excluded.399 
Distributive and compensatory justice, by contrast, are better 
aligned with a variation on the “welfare principle” of tort remedies. 
The welfare principle spreads the costs of socially beneficial conduct 
so that society, rather than the entity that caused the harm, bears 
some degree of the cost of the injury caused.400 The aim of the welfare 
principle is not complete repair of the harm done, but rather the 
maintenance of a certain baseline standard of economic welfare.401 
This principle counsels that the aim of public compensation for the 
incidental harms of socially beneficial conduct should not necessarily 
aim to make the injured party “whole,” but rather, it should ensure 
that he or she is not further injured or left below a socially acceptable 
baseline.402 This principle can be seen at work in countries that choose 
to incorporate research related injuries into a broader medical 
compensation scheme, such as Sweden and New Zealand.403 In those 
countries, all medical injuries are generally compensable, but 
compensation is pegged at a capped percentage of the individual’s 
actual economic losses. Because care is provided through national 
health systems, the economic losses consist of lost wages and lost 
future capacity.404 
Both nonmaleficence and distributive or compensatory justice 
counsel that careful attention should be paid to the underlying 
 
397. Id. at 610. 
398. See supra Part III.A. 
399. See HART & HONORÉ, supra note 273, at 80. It should be noted that in 
the case of a road accident there is also another, more proximate, duty 
bearer in the form of the negligent driver.  
400. KEETON ET AL., supra note 260, at 612. 
401. Id. 
402. See id. 
403. See supra Part I (discussing Sweden and New Zealand’s compensation 
systems). 
404. See supra Part I. 
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condition of the subject and the type and degree of the injury in 
determining what economic damages are owed. The goal of economic 
damages in this context is not to put the subject in the best position 
possible, but rather to mitigate the financial risks of research 
participation and to ensure that the participant is no worse off than if 
he or she had decided to forego research participation and instead 
seek standard of care treatment. Alternatively, compensation may be 
used to ensure a baseline level of economic welfare. Analysis of 
causation will, therefore, have some influence on the remedy that is 
appropriate because reduction in the amount of any payment may be 
justified when the participant’s underlying condition or some other 
additional cause contributed to the participant’s morbidity or 
mortality.405 Type of injury also affects the determination of the 
appropriate remedy because, as mentioned above, some types of 
injury are not likely to be cured by monetary compensation.406 
Similarly, degree of injury is an important consideration because more 
severe injuries will require a greater degree of compensation in order 
to place the subject in as good a position as he would have been in 
had he decided to forego research participation. 
In order to take all of the appropriate factors into account, a 
number of countries rely on their statutory frameworks for 
determination of damages in personal injury (tort) cases to set the 
amount of compensation owed in medical injury cases.407 Factors 
considered may include the severity of the trial participant’s 
underlying illness, the type of injury suffered, lost wages, and lost 
earning capacity.408 Reliance on the tort framework has been 
controversial in some cases because it may eliminate damages where 
the patient-participant is already severely ill and therefore does not 
have economic damages, but nonetheless has suffered a significant 
injury.409 Calculation of economic remedies based on a tort measure of 
damages also risks treating participants differently based on their 
income.410 Higher-income research participants would receive more in 
compensation than lower-income participants who suffered the same 
 
405. See HART & HONORÉ, supra note 273, at 180. 
406. See supra Part III.B. 
407. HELLBACHER ET AL, supra note 80; Biskmark & Paterson, supra note 46, 
at 280; Kuroyanagi, supra note 68. 
408. See Henry et al., supra note 115, at 23-24. 
409. Kuroyanagi, supra note 68. For example, if a participant in a phase one 
oncology trial is so ill that the participant is unable to work before 
beginning participation in the trial, and the trial intervention both fails 
to help the participant’s cancer and also causes significant deterioration 
in the participant’s quality of life, then the participant will have suffered 
harm but will not have an economic harm.  
410. See Henry et al., supra note 115, at 24-25. 
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injury. A system based on tort damages would therefore fail to treat 
like patients alike.411 Such an arrangement may provide an incentive 
for researchers and institutions to select participants of low 
socioeconomic status. Allocation of economic remedies should take 
account of the likelihood of out-of-pocket costs of medical care to the 
participant, including future care, lost wages, and any disability or 
diminished earning capacity. Both long-term and short-term disability 
benefits should be available. Amounts should be tied to a uniform 
national standard that adequately compensates individuals for their 
contribution but also treats like participants alike.412  
2. Non-Economic Remedies 
The principle of reparative justice provides the best fit with a 
requirement to provide non-economic remedies. Non-economic 
remedies compensate for intangible harms, such as pain and suffering, 
and are appropriate when the harm suffered is the result of some form 
of wrongdoing.413 Nonmaleficence and distributive and compensatory 
justice provide inadequate support for a requirement to pay non-
economic remedies because in those cases wrongdoing is not at the 
root of the obligation to pay compensation.414 Requiring the provision 
of non-economic remedies in the absence of wrongdoing risks deterring 
the conduct of socially beneficial research activities and might also 
present unworkable administrative difficulties. 
In the case of reparative justice, however, punitive damages may 
be appropriate both as a deterrent to future wrongdoing and to 
acknowledge responsibility for the harm that was caused.415 The “fault 
 
411. Id. at 4. 
412. Id. at 24. Such a standard should not be a set amount, but should be 
pegged to a measure that will rise with inflation such as the GS scale. 
See also U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, DIV. OF COAL MINE WORKER’S COMP., 
BLACK LUNG MONTHLY BENEFIT RATES FOR 2014 (setting the benefit for 
all coal miners disabled by black lung disease at “37.5% of the base 
salary of a Federal employee at level GS-2, Step 1”) available at 
http://www.dol.gov/owcp/dcmwc/regs/compliance/blbene.htm (last 
visited Oct. 20. 2014). See also 20 CFR § 726.203(c)(4) (2014); 30 
U.S.C. § 901 et seq. (2012). Determination of the amount at issue is an 
appropriate activity for notice and comment rulemaking under the 
Administrative Procedure Act. 
413. See supra Part III.B (discussing types of injuries covered and the 
relationship of type to the justifications supporting compensation). 
414. See supra Part II. 
415. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 944 (“The utility of this 
punitive element in damages is twofold. It may have emotional value to 
the plaintiff, a matter of special significance in those cases in which the 
wrong is essentially an injury to the plaintiff’s sentimental interests, as 
in personal defamation or interference with domestic relations. At the 
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principle” flowing from reparative justice has been succinctly 
summarized as, “[w]hen blameworthy conduct causes harm to others, 
the blameworthy actor ought, in general, to compensate for those 
harms.”416 An individual who wrongfully causes harm to another has 
an obligation to repair the full extent of the damage—in whatever 
form it may be—and non-economic remedies are appropriate when 
their application is necessary to make the harmed individual whole. 
Additional monetary penalties may be appropriate as a deterrent 
against future bad behavior. As stated above, these cases should be 
handled through the tort law framework and not through a no fault 
compensation system.417 
E. Application 
A morally justified compensation framework should be based on 
principles of nonmaleficence and justice and should take into account 
all four elements of a well-regulated injury. Within these boundaries, 
there is considerable flexibility with respect to policy design. Practical 
implementation concerns such as burdens of proof must be thought 
through when deciding among potential systems of compensation and 
determining what type of system might be appropriate. In light of the 
difficulty of proving causation, especially in clinical trials involving 
patient-subjects, a preponderance of the evidence standard is 
appropriate.418 A no-fault compensation system would cover all 
injuries that were more likely than not caused by research.419 This 
standard should be interpreted leniently in favor of the research 
participant because the sponsor or institution is likely to have more 
expertise in the matter and better access to the evidence.420 
Two systems seem to be the most justifiable in light of both the 
reasons supporting compensation and the four elements of a 
compensable research injury. One would be based on a mandatory 
insurance or self-insurance/indemnity requirement for research 
sponsors and institutions, and the other would be an administrative 
specialty court. Each has different strengths and weaknesses and 
aligns differently with the various relevant considerations. 
An insurance or indemnity system is both justifiable and 
feasible.421 It has the benefit of allowing cost sharing between the 
 
same time, the punishment inherent in the remedy will have a more or 
less deterrent effect upon the defendant.”). 
416. KEETON ET AL., supra note 260, at 608. 
417. Henry et al., supra note 115, at 7. 
418. Id. at 10-11. 
419. See id. at 3.  
420. Id. at 10-11. 
421. See generally id. 
Health Matrix·Volume 25·2015  
Defining Compensable Injury in Biomedical Research 
379 
research enterprise, which holds the strongest duty in nonmaleficence, 
and the general public whose broader obligation is based in 
distributive and compensatory justice. Sponsors or institutions would 
be required to purchase insurance coverage proportionate to the risk 
burden of the institution’s research profile.422 This insurance would be 
used to cover all compensable research related injuries on a no-fault 
basis.423 The cost of insurance or self-insurance could feasibly be 
passed on to consumers of medical products to allow for broader 
distribution of the burdens.424  
If administered by an outside insurer, this approach would be 
rule-based because determinations with respect to the appropriateness 
of compensation would be made by an insurer relying on a standard 
definition of “research related injury.” An insurance-based plan is 
thus less flexible in application than an administrative approach. It 
also has the drawback of being more opaque with respect to its 
reasoning regarding whether or not an injury is compensable, and as 
such raises some procedural justice concerns. Finally, insurance may 
be subject to conflicts of interest because the insurer has an incentive 
to deny claims in order to maintain a better profit margin. 
A variation on the insurance model would be to place the locus of 
responsibility on research institutions rather than research sponsors. 
This would account for the wide variation in types of funding for and 
goals of research. Institutions would have the ability to self insure by 
setting aside a fund for compensation of research injuries that is 
commensurate with the risk profile of the research that it conducts.425 
Institutions would also be able to arrange for other duty bearers to 
contribute to the self-insurance plan. For example, an institution 
would be able to work out an arrangement for a for-profit company to 
purchase commercial insurance for their clinical trial, but would be 
able to either self-insure or otherwise provide assurance that 
participants in not-for-profit or government sponsored research would 
be compensated. The institution also has less of a conflict of interest 
with respect to research subject compensation because it is likely to 
reap reputational and scientific benefits if subjects feel that the 
institution is well regulated and accountable.426  
Placing the locus of responsibility on the institution also has the 
advantage of working in tandem with existing adverse event reporting 
 
422. See id. at 8.  
423. Id. 
424. Id. at 8 (explaining that many pharmaceutical companies incorporate 
funds set aside for compensation purposes into their research spending). 
425. See id. 
426. See London, supra note 337, at 933-34; see also U.S. PRESIDENTIAL 
COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, supra note 16, at 61-62. 
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systems and allowing for greater procedural transparency.427 Under 
such a system, either an investigator or a participant could report a 
suspected research related injury to an institutional administrator.428 
The administrator would seek evidence from both parties and make 
an initial determination as to whether an injury was research 
related.429 All decisions would be made based on a preponderance of 
the evidence and the standard would be interpreted in favor of the 
injured subject.430 An institutional insurance/indemnity plan should 
provide uniform compensation for medical costs, long- and short-term 
disability, and a death benefit.431 Such payments ought to be based on 
a national measure that does not vary based on the participant’s 
income or the institution where the research is conducted.432 Such an 
approach might be more palatable to some institutions than the 
current practice many undertake of simply settling lawsuits from 
injured participants before they go to trial.433  
An administrative court system, by contrast, would place more of 
the burden on the general public, but could receive some of its 
funding from the research industry. Such an approach would account 
for the different ethical obligations held by different stakeholders in 
the research enterprise. It would have the benefit of being able to 
apply a standard-based casuistic approach through an expert decision 
maker. This approach could lead to more predictable and less opaque 
decision-making that is more readily subject to oversight. In such a 
system, it may be beneficial to place the burden of proof on the 
researchers and their sponsors and institutions because those parties 
are the most likely to have access to the evidence. If the compensation 
framework is divorced from any type of malpractice or accountability 
proceedings, requiring researchers to furnish evidence pertaining to a 
particular participant’s care may be easier and will provide the best 
chance of getting a factual determination of the causes of the injury.434 
It is unlikely, however, that such an approach will be politically 
 
427. Henry et al., supra note 115, at 22-23. 
428. Id. 
429. Id. 
430. Id. See, e.g., GENERAL MOTORS IGNITION COMPENSATION CLAIMS 
RESOLUTION FACILITY, GENERAL MOTORS IGNITION COMPENSATION FUND 
PROTOCOL (June 30, 2014) 
http://www.gmignitioncompensation.com/docs/FINAL%20PROTOCOL
%20June%2030%20%202014.pdf. 
431. Henry et al., supra note 115, at 24-25. 
432. Id. 
433. A waiver should be required for individuals who choose to accept the 
payment. See id. at 26. 
434. See, e.g., Kachalia et al., supra note 113, at 400.  
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feasible given the lack of will to put any compensation system in place 
over the past several decades.435 An administrative court system 
divorced from the institution also raises serious concerns about the 
burden on research participants436 and about the equitable sharing of 
the cost of research injuries. 
In light of all of the relevant considerations, an institution-based 
self-insurance approach combined with a similar requirement for 
sponsors of research is both the best compensation system and the 
one that is most likely to be implemented.437 An institution-based self-
insurance/indemnity approach places the burden of compensation on 
those in the best position to foresee and minimize risks. It also allows 
for cost sharing between institutions, sponsors and the public to the 
extent that costs of funding the compensation system are built into 
either the cost of care at the institution or the cost of the products 
produced.438 Furthermore, an institution based insurance/self-
insurance requirement is easily compatible with other systems of 
compensation around the world. This is a consideration of particular 
importance in light of the amount of international research conducted 
by sponsors within the United States.  
This type of practice already has support at some institutions 
within the United States and would require less political and 
regulatory change to implement than the creation of a specialized 
court or public compensation fund.439 It also has the benefit of 
enabling a less burdensome administrative claims process and 
minimizing bureaucracy thus allowing for efficiency in getting 
financial compensation to those who need it.440 
Conclusion 
At the heart of an ethically justifiable compensation system is a 
succinct and appropriate definition of what constitutes a compensable 
research related injury. That definition should contain the four 
regulatory elements of causation, type, degree, and remedy. In short, 
 
435. See, e.g., Henry, supra note 13, at 412; see also Alan J. Weisbard, The 
Role of Philosophers in the Public Policy Process: A View from the 
President’s Commission, 97 ETHICS 776, 779-82 (1987). 
436. See Genevieve M. Grant et al., Relationship Between Stressfulness of 
Claiming for Injury Compensation and Long-term Recovery, 71(4) 
JAMA PSYCHIATRY 446, 446 (2014). 
437. See Henry et al., supra note 115, at 14. 
438. See supra Part II. 
439. See Henry et al., supra note 115 at 11, 27. 
440. See id. at 5. See also Grant et al., supra note 436, at 446 (noting that a 
more stressful claiming process is associated with a longer recovery 
time). 
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a compensable injury is a medical injury, caused by the subject’s 
research participation, and is of such a degree that medical treatment 
alone is insufficient to remedy the harm caused. By using this 
definition as a starting point, it is possible that, in spite of forty years 
of inaction, the research community may begin to move toward a 
comprehensive no-fault approach to compensation of research related 
injuries. In doing so, the research community in the United States 
would not only join the ranks of most other countries engaged in 
significant biomedical research, but would also fulfill a long-neglected 
ethical obligation. 
 
